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CRIMINAL LAW
I. NATURE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES ALTERED
In State v. Jones1 the South Carolina Supreme Court sim-
plified the process of challenging racially discriminatory peremp-
tory challenges.2 The court shelved the cumbersome analytic
framework described in Batson v. Kentucky' in favor of a
bright-line test. The defendant's burden of showing evidence of
the prosecutor's purposeful discrimination is removed from the
Batson analysis. South Carolina's rule meets the minimal consti-
tutional requirements set forth in Batson. In addition, the pro-
phylactic approach eliminates strains on judicial resources. The
supreme court also established a strict and easily implemented
remedy for a Batson violation. Trial courts now will replace im-
properly challenged jurors on the venire and begin the jury se-
lection process de novo. The risk of seating a hostile juror, one
previously challenged on racial grounds, should discourage solic-
itors from exercising illegal peremptory challenges.
Irving Jones, a black man, was convicted of possession of
heroin with intent to distribute and was sentenced to fifteen
1. 293 S.C. 54, 358 S.E.2d 701 (1987).
2. In South Carolina a defendant facing serious criminal charges is entitled to ten
peremptory challenges, and the state is entitled to five. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1110 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1987).
3. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Batson v. Kentucky the Court held that a state prosecu-
tor who exercises peremptory challenges based on race does so in violation of the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 86. Batson establishes a
framework for analyzing a defendant's objection to the prosecutor's peremptory chal-
lenge. To establish a prima facie case under Batson, a defendant must show: 1) the de-
fendant is a member of a cognizable racial group; 2) the prosecutor has exercised pe-
remptory challenges to remove venire members of the defendant's race; and 3) facts and
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor is acting with racially discrimina-
tory motives. The burden of proof then shifts to the prosecutor, who must give a neutral
explanation for a questionable peremptory challenge. Id. at 96-97.
The explanation requirement is contrary to the traditional understanding of the pe-
remptory challenge. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1023 (5th ed. 1979) defines peremptory
challenge as "[t]he right to challenge a juror without assigning a reason for the chal-
lenge." Accordingly, state supreme courts have scrambled to institute Batson's analytical
framework within their respective jurisdictions.
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years in prison. At Jones' trial, which was prior to Batson,4 the
solicitor used three of his peremptory challenges to strike blacks
from the jury. The defendant objected to the peremptory strikes
on constitutional grounds. The trial judge neither conducted a
hearing nor interrogated the solicitor concerning his reasons for
the peremptory challenges. Jones appealed, citing Batson, and
demanded a new trial.
5
The constitutional limitations on the prosecutor's use of pe-
remptory challenges, as described in Batson, represent a signifi-
cant departure from the traditional treatment of peremptory
challenges under South Carolina law.' The South Carolina Su-
preme Court has adopted a unique procedure to govern the limi-
tations on peremptory challenges:
Rather than deciding on a case by case basis whether the de-
fendant is entitled to a hearing based upon a prima facie show-
ing of purposeful discrimination under the vague guidelines set
forth by the United States Supreme Court, the better course to
follow would be to hold a Batson hearing on the defendant's
request whenever the defendant is a member of a cognizable
racial group and the prosecutor exercises peremptory chal-
lenges to remove members of defendant's race from the venire.
This bright line test would ensure consistency by removing any
doubt about when a Batson hearing should be conducted. Fur-
ther, this procedure would ensure a complete record for appel-
late review.
7
The prima facie case is established once a minority defendant
makes a timely objection to peremptory challenges against mem-
bers of the defendant's race. The burden then shifts to the pros-
ecutor to provide neutral explanations."
The court also decided several procedural questions. First, a
defendant must object prior to the swearing of the jury in order
to raise a Batson issue. Second, if the prosecutor is unable to
carry the burden created by the defendant's objection, the trial
judge shall begin the jury selection process anew. The improp-
erly stricken minority veniremen are replaced in a reconstructed
4. Batson is retroactive. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 1708 (1987).
5. 293 S.C. at 55, 358 S.E.2d at 702.
6. See supra note 3.
7. 293 S.C. at 57, 358 S.E.2d at 703.
8. Id. at 58, 358 S.E.2d at 703.
[Vol. 40
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venire.
After Batson the first issue facing a trial court following an
objection to a peremptory challenge is whether the facts consti-
tute a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the use of pe-
remptory challenges. Unlike the majority of jurisdictions in
which courts must figure out whether the facts and circum-
stances infer purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor, South
Carolina trial courts need only determine whether the defendant
is a member of a cognizable racial group and if other members of
that race were peremptorily challenged.10 In Jones, for instance,
the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges against black ve-
niremen, and Jones, himself, was black man; thus, the prima fa-
cie case was shown.
The bright-line approach is an improvement over the Bat-
son analysis for two reasons. First, the bright line test is much
simpler and will economize judicial resources. The problem
caused by the complicated Batson approach is best illustrated
by similar cases already litigated in other jurisdictions. One re-
curring issue that has generated an abundance of case law is
whether the prima facie showing is made when all members of a
minority defendant's race are peremptory challenged and the
defendant is then tried before an all white jury. Arizona, North
Carolina, and two district courts in Florida hold that these facts
alone do not meet the prima facie burden.1" The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, and one Florida
district court hold that they do."
9. Id. at 58, 358 S.E.2d at 704. The court stated:
In some of the larger counties, it may be possible to call forth a new jury panel
from the pool. Elsewhere, the members of the tainted jury and all persons who
were struck shall be placed back in the jury venire. The jury selection process
shall start anew using this "reconstructed" venire.
Id. at 58 n.3., 358 S.E.2d at 704 n.3.
10. Id. at 57, 358 S.E.2d at 703.
11. See State v. Holder, 155 Ariz. 80, 745 P.2d 141 (1987) (en banc) (no prima facie
case when black defendant tried before an all-white jury after two black jurors peremp-
torily challenged); Blackshear v. State, 504 So. 2d 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd,
521 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1988) (exclusion of all blacks by itself is insufficient to trigger
inquiry into prosecutor's motives); Kibler v. State, 501 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (exclusion of all blacks by itself is insufficient to trigger inquiry into prosecutor's
motives); State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 356 S.E.2d 279 (1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
269 (1987) (no prima facie case when prosecutor used seven out of thirteen peremptory
challenges against black people leaving an all-white jury).
12. See United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987) (prima facie case
1988]
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Second, under the South Carolina test, solicitors must dis-
close the reasoning behind their peremptory challenges of mi-
nority members of the venire. To the contrary, under the Batson
approach, the Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Allen
1
3
that no inference of racial discrimination was raised when the
prosecution left three black jurors on the panel, though the pros-
ecutor had peremptorily challenged five consecutive black ve-
niremen.14 By allowing selected blacks to pass to the jury, the
prosecution may feel confident that future peremptory chal-
lenges need not be justified. Therefore, under certain circum-
stances in the Fourth Circuit, the prosecution need not explain
minority strikes and perhaps may engage in racially discrimina-
tory peremptory challenges as long as they do not create an all
white jury. In Batson Justice Marshall predicted,
Evidentiary analysis similar to that set out by the Court has
been adopted as a matter of state law in States including Mas-
sachusetts and California. Cases from those jurisdictions illus-
trate the limitations of the approach. First, defendants cannot
attack the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges at all
unless the challenges are so flagrant as to establish a prima
facie case. This means, in those States, that where only one or
two black jurors survive the challenges for cause, the prosecu-
tor need have no compunction about striking them from the
jury because of their race.15
when all-white jury left after one peremptory challenge); Pearson v. State, 514 So. 2d 374
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (peremptory challenge of one black juror leaving an all-white
jury is a prima facie case); State v. Sandoval, 105 N.M. 696, 736 P.2d 501 (1987) (fact
that all members of a defendant's race were excluded enough to establish a prima facie
showing); Commonwealth v. McCormick, 359 Pa. Super. 461, 519 A.2d 442 (1986) (infer-
ence of racial discrimination raised when all black veniremen peremptory challenged
leaving an all-white jury).
13. 666 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Va. 1987).
14. See also United States v. Dennis, 804 F.2d 1208 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 1973 (1987) (no inference of discrimination when prosecutor used three of six
peremptory challenges to strike black men but accepted two black women without chal-
lenge); State v. Belton, 318 N.C. 141, 347 S.E.2d 755 (1986) (no inference of racial dis-
crimination when four black people sat on the petit jury of twelve though the State
peremptorily challenged six black people); State v. Smith, 293 S.C. 22, 358 S.E.2d 389
(1987) (in a case prior to Jones, the court held no inference of discrimination when the
state used two of five peremptory challenges against black people but four black jurors
were seated). But see Fleming v. Kemp, 794 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1986) (inference of
discrimination drawn from the fact the prosecutor used eight of ten peremptory chal-
lenges against black people notwithstanding the fact black people served on the jury).
15. 476 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 40
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Unlike other states, however, South Carolina solicitors cannot
engage in routine racial peremptory challenges once they statis-
tically rebut the Batson prima facie case. Whenever the state
makes one peremptory challenge against a venireman of the de-
fendant's race, it must disclose its reasoning.
The second major issue a trial court must confront in a Bat-
son hearing is an evaluation of the solicitor's motives.1 Justice
Marshall expressed his reservations about this portion of the
Batson analysis:
[T]rial courts face the difficult burden of assessing prosecutors'
motives .... Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral
reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are ill-equipped to
second-guess those reasons .... If ... easily generated expla-
nations are sufficient to discharge the prosecutor's obligation to
justify his strikes on nonracial grounds, then the protection er-
ected by the Court today may be illusory.
17
These reservations are well founded. At least one jurisdiction
permits the prosecutor's hunch to meet the burden.18 Other ju-
risdictions will permit the prosecutor to overcome the defend-
ant's inference of discrimination by relying on a subjective im-
pression of the jurors' behavior.1 9 In addition, reviewing courts
must ordinarily accord the trial court judges "great deference.
'20
16. The following factors have been considered by courts in Batson hearings: 1) the
prosecution's reasons were not related to the facts of the case; 2) there was a lack of
meaningful questioning of the challenged juror; 3) there was disparate treatment in
striking jurors; 4) the prosecution used fewer than all of her peremptory challenges; 5)
there was a pattern of strikes against minority jurors; 6) the prosecution's type and man-
ner of questions implied racial intent; 7) none, or few, of the minority members were on
the petit jury. See Branch v. Alabama, 526 So. 2d 609 (Ala. 1987).
17. 476 U.S. at 105-06 (Marshall, J., concurring).
18. See Missouri v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 67 (Mo. 1987) ("Batson does not pre-
vent 'hunch' challenges so long as racial animus is not the motive.").
19. See United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1987) (reason for challenge
was the juror's posture and demeanor); United States v. Allen, 666 F. Supp. 847 (E.D.Va.
1987) (no evidence that the prosecutor's intuitive reactions to jurors' appearance and
behavior were racially motivated); King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (jurors seemed uncommunicative); Lockett v. Mississippi, 517 So. 2d 1317 (Miss.
1987) (en banc) (juror rolled her eyes); State v. Brown, 747 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988) (juror demeanor); Smith v. State, 734 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1987) (juror slouched, wore
gold chains, rings and watch); Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. App. 1987) (juror
"body english"); Yarbough v. State, 732 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. App. 1987) (juror demeanor);
Taitano v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 342, 358 S.E.2d 590 (1987) (juror dress and
demeanor).
20. 476 U.S. at 98 n.21. Most courts have interpreted "great deference" to mean
1988]
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Those courts that allow the prosecutor to overcome the defend-
ant's prima facie showing on the prosecution's hunch, or subjec-
tive opinion, render the Batson protections illusory.
Justice Marshall's prediction seems less likely to occur in
South Carolina. In State v. Martinez21 a divided supreme court
upheld the solicitor's peremptory strikes against four black ju-
rors. The solicitor explained that two of the men were chal-
lenged because they were of the same age and sex as the defend-
ant. The solicitor, however, allowed whites of the same age and
sex to pass to the jury. In other words, the solicitor exhibited
disparate treatment of black and white veniremen. Although the
court affirmed the trial court's acceptance of the solicitor's rea-
soning, the case should, nevertheless, send a warning signal to
South Carolina trial judges about accepting trivial motives.
Chief Justice Ness, in his dissent, quoted State v. Butler22
with approval: "'Rubber stamp' approval of all nonracial expla-
nations, no matter how whimsical or fanciful, would cripple Bat-
son's commitment to 'ensure that no citizen is disqualified from
jury service because of his race.' ",23 It seems unlikely a South
Carolina trial court could be comfortable accepting a superficial
reason from the solicitor in light of the Chief Justice's strong
criticism of the majority opinion. Viewed pragmatically, the ben-
efit to the overall process by sustaining a Batson objection, re-
constructing the venire, and beginning the jury selection process
anew before the trial starts, outweighs the risk of reversal and a
new trial.
The remedy imposed by Jones, replacing illegally chal-
lenged jurors in a reconstructed venire, is likely to inhibit ra-
cially discriminatory peremptory challenges as well. This de
novo procedure is efficient because the state is not required to
call an entirely new venire. The reconstructed venire creates
that a trial judge's findings will not be overturned unless they are "clearly erroneous."
See Wiley v. Mississippi, No. DP-57 (Miss. Nov. 25, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Miss.
file).
21. 294 S.C. 72, 362 S.E.2d 641 (1987).
22. 731 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
23. 294 S.C. at 77, 362 S.E.2d at 644 (Ness, C.J., dissenting) (citing State v. Butler,
731 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)). See also Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509 (8th Cir.
1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 233 (1987) (prosecutor's reasons were only facially suffi-
cient and were, in reality, a pretext for racial discrimination when he decided not to
strike white jurors who differed in no significant way from black jurors who were
excused).
[Vol. 40
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some obvious problems for the prosecution, however. Jurors who
earlier had been peremptorily challenged may be used against
the state's case. The solicitor would be wise to avoid the risk of
alienating ultimate jurors by racially motivated strikes in the in-
itial selection process.
"The [Constitution] nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-
minded modes of discrimination." '24 In State v. Jones South
Carolina has taken a logical and fair approach to the recent con-
stitutional requirements of Batson v. Kentucky. This "bright
line test" is efficient and meets constitutional requirements. Ra-
cially motivated peremptory challenges by solicitors are discour-
aged because of the de novo procedure following a successful
Batson challenge. Other jurisdictions, struggling to implement
Batson's cumbersome guidelines, would do well to adopt the
lead of South Carolina in establishing an approach to the prob-
lem which is both fair and economical.
Edwin Lake Turnage
II. RIGHT TO COUNSEL NOT VIOLATED BY JUDGE'S PROHIBITING
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT FROM CONFERRING WITH COUNSEL
BETWEEN DIRECT AND CROSS-EXAMINATION
In Perry v. Leeke2 5 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a trial judge's order prohibiting a criminal defendant
from conferring with his attorney during a fifteen-minute recess
between his direct and cross-examination did not deprive the
defendant of his sixth amendment right to counsel. By mandat-
ing that all sixth amendment claims be judged by whether the
defendant suffered prejudice, the court muddled what was once
a clear rule in an already convoluted area of the law.
In August 1981 Donald Ray Perry was indicted for murder,
kidnapping, and criminal sexual conduct in the first degree.
Perry was called to testify in his jury trial. At the conclusion of
defense counsel's direct examination of Perry, the trial judge or-
dered a fifteen-minute recess. During this recess, Perry's counsel
attempted to speak with him, evidently to answer a question
Perry had and to advise him of his rights on cross-examination.
24. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
25. 832 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1269 (1988).
1988]
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The trial judge prohibited the consultation, ordering that Perry
"was not entitled to be cured or assisted or helped approaching
his cross examination."'26 Perry's counsel's objection to the order
was overruled. Perry, subsequently, was convicted of all three
counts.27
On appeal to the supreme court, Perry argued that prohibit-
ing consultation with counsel during the fifteen-minute recess
violated his right to counsel under the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution. The court disagreed and affirmed
the conviction.28
In November 1985 Perry petitioned for writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina on the basis that the trial judge's order
amounted to a denial of his sixth amendment right to the effec-
tive assistance of counsel. The district court ordered that the
writ should issue unless Perry was retried within a reasonable
period of time. The state appealed the district court's order to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The court of appeals held that Perry's sixth amendment
right to the assistance of counsel had not been violated, since he
had not been prejudiced by the order. The court noted that in
Geders v. United States29 the Supreme Court held that a de-
fendant's right to counsel was violated, requiring automatic re-
versal, when the trial court prevented him from consulting with
his counsel during a seventeen-hour overnight recess. The Court
in Geders, however, refused to delineate precise boundaries for
when automatic reversal is required.30
The court of appeals then analyzed its own opinion in
United States v. Allen,31 which held that "a restriction on a de-
fendant's right to consult with his attorney during a brief rou-
tine recess is constitutionally impermissible"' 2 and that reversal
26. Record at 144.
27. The state sought the death penalty, but the jury recommended life imprison-
ment. 832 F.2d at 839.
28. State v. Perry, 278 S.C. 490, 299 S.E.2d 324 (1983). Subsequently, Perry's peti-
tion for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied. Perry v. South Caro-
lina, 461 U.S. 908 (1983).
29. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
30. See id. at 89 n.2, 91.
31. 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908 (1977).
32. Id. at 634.
[Vol. 40
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was necessary regardless of whether the restriction resulted in
prejudice. Six years later, in Stubbs v. Bordenkircher,33 the
court reaffirmed Allen but added the requirement that the de-
fendant "show that he desired to consult with his attorney, and
would have consulted with him but for the restriction placed
upon him by the trial judge." 4
The court then concluded that Allen and Stubbs were no
longer controlling because of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Strickland v. Washington5 and United States v. Cronic 6 The
court posited that these decisions require an inquiry into
whether the alleged sixth amendment violation was prejudicial
to the defendant. Labeling as false any distinction between "de-
nial of counsel" cases and "ineffective assistance of counsel"
cases, the court stated that in any sixth amendment claim, "'the
ultimate focus of the inquiry must be on the fundamental fair-
ness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.' ",37
The court reasoned that since fairness is the purpose under-
lying the sixth amendment right, such right to counsel claims
should "always focus . . . on prejudice. Automatic reversal is
warranted only where prejudice can be presumed. '381
The Strickland test of ineffective assistance of counsel con-
sists of two prongs that a petitioner normally must satisfy in or-
der to sustain his sixth amendment claim. The petitioner must
show: 1) that counsel's performance was deficient and 2) that
the deficiencies in counsel's performance were prejudicial to the
defendant, in the sense that there is "a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different." 39
The court found that Perry satisfied neither prong. The
quality of his counsel's performance was superb; the restrictions
on his access to counsel were incredibly brief; and the evidence
against him was overwhelming. Moreover, the court contended
that there was nothing that Perry's counsel could have accom-
plished by conferring with Perry that would have improved his
33. 689 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907 (1983).
34. 689 F.2d at 1207.
35. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
36. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
37. 832 F.2d at 841 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984)).
38. Id.
39. 466 U.S. at 694.
1988]
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client's performance during cross-examination. Finally, the court
expounded several policy arguments (notably judicial economy
and victim's rights) to buttress its holding.
In relying on Strickland and Cronic for the proposition that
the touchstone of any sixth amendment claim is fairness, the
Perry court emphasized that "[t]he proper inquiry is whether
this trial was unfair . . in short, whether justice was done in
this case."' 40 While this approach has emotional appeal, it is fun-
damentally at odds with the sixth amendment. The purpose of
the right to counsel is to ensure that the criminal defendant re-
ceives a fair trial.41 Thus, it is inherently prophylactic. While the
court's concern for the fairness of the trial is cosmetically attrac-
tive, its effect is to place the right to counsel in intellectual
quicksand. If there is no sixth amendment violation when the
state denies a defendant assistance of his counsel during a fif-
teen-minute recess, because the overall trial was "fair," it follows
that the assistance of counsel should be constitutionally required
only where it is necessary to ensure a fair trial. Both the sixth
amendment, by its very terms, and Gideon v. Wainwright 42
make it clear, however, that no trial is fair unless the accused
has the assistance of counsel. The sixth amendment focuses on
the "means" (the process that leads to a verdict), while Strick-
land, Cronic and Perry focus on the "ends" (the outcome of the
trial).43 While a brief restriction of the right to counsel may not
result in any actual unfairness to the accused, the restriction it-
self creates the appearance of unfairness-a specter Gideon spe-
cifically sought to suppress.44
40. 832 F.2d at 842 (emphasis in original). Cf. 466 U.S. at 658 ("[T]he right to the
effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect
it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.").
41. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
42. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that reversal is automatic when a defendant is
deprived of the presence and aid of his attorney, either throughout the prosecution or
during a critical stage in a capital offense).
43. Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Con-
stitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 645
(1986).
44. See 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recog-
nize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him. . . .The right. . . to counsel may not be deemed
[Vol. 40
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While the Perry court correctly perceived that claims can-
not be classified as either "denial of counsel" cases or "ineffec-
tive assistance" cases, it overlooked the classification discussed
in Strickland. Strickland recognized that while both types of
cases fall under the rubric of "the right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel, ' 45 there is a distinction between the types of
violations of this right: (1) government violations of the right
and (2) counsel's violations of the right. Strickland expressly
dealt only with the latter. Its two-part test is couched in lan-
guage that is intelligible only when used to judge the perform-
ance of counsel at trial.46 Thus, even if Strickland and Cronic
mean that a "prejudice" analysis should be employed when the
government violates the accused's rights to counsel, the Strick-
land test is not the proper mode of analysis.
Furthermore, Cronic plainly states that there are situations
when prejudice is presumed and per se reversal proper:
There are ... circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the
accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular
case is unjustified....
Most obvious, of course, is the complete denial of counsel.
The presumption that counsel's assistance is essential requires
us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied
counsel at a critical stage of his trial....
The court has uniformly found constitutional error without
any showing of prejudice when counsel was either totally ab-
sent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical
stage of the proceeding.4
The majority of circuits have required automatic reversal
when counsel is barred from consulting with his client for any
amount of time during the trial.48 There is no real cost to the
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have
laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to as-
sure fair trials before impartial tribunals ....
Id. at 344.
45. 466 U.S. at 686.
46. Id.
47. 466 U.S. at 658, 659, 659 n.25.
48. See, e.g., Mudd v. United States, 798 F.2d 1509, 1513-14 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Crutchfield v. Wainwright, 803 F.2d 1103, 1108-09 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 107 S. Ct. 3235 (1987); United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101, 102 (8th Cir. 1978)
(dicta); United States v. Bryant, 545 F.2d 1035, 1036 (6th Cir. 1976).
1988]
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state, and fear of fraud or other unethical conduct is unwar-
ranted.49 By requiring the defendant to prove prejudice, the
Perry court may be demanding what is both a practical and the-
oretical impossibility: "First, it would be very difficult for the
defendant to show that the trial may have been altered had con-
sultation been allowed. Second, such an inquiry would require
that destructive inroads be forged into the attorney-client rela-
tionship."50 In effect, Perry creates a presumption of no
prejudice - a reality unwittingly expressed by the majority:
"There is no reason to believe that any communication which
might have occurred during the brief recess at issue could have
altered Perry's performance on cross-examination."'"
The Perry decision introduces new confusion. By aban-
doning the Allen-Stubbs bright line rule of per se reversal, yet
recognizing the automatic reversal standard of Geders, the court
gives no guidance to situations when the trial court denies the
accused assistance of counsel for a period longer than fifteen
minutes, yet shorter than the seventeen-hour prohibition found
unconstitutional in Geders.
David Garrison Hill
III. STANDARD NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY STOP AND FRISK
RELAXED
In United States v. Moore52 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that an investigatory stop and frisk is valid when a
police officer, responding to a silent burglar alarm, stops and
49. See 832 F.2d at 845 (Winter, C.J., dissenting). See also United States v. Allen,
542 F,2d 630, 633 ("Such a fear rests upon more cynicism than is justified by the per-
formance of the bar."); United States v. Geders 425 U.S. 80, 93 (Marshall, J., concurring)
("If any order barring communication between a defendant and his attorney is to survive
constitutional inquiry, it must be for some reason other than a fear of unethical
conduct.").
50. Crutchfield v. Wainwright, 803 F.2d 1103, 1114 n.11 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
51. 832 F.2d at 843. Contra 832 F.2d at 848-49 (Winter, C.J., dissenting):
It is not difficult to conceive of situations in which a ten or fifteen minute
recess could be critical to the outcome of a trial .... Even an attorney's sooth-
ing assurances to a defendant, prior to cross-examination, along with remind-
ers of the rules for such testimony, could have a marked effect on a defendant's
performance and demeanor on the stand.
Id.
52. 817 F.2d 1105 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 456 (1987).
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frisks an individual who is walking thirty to forty yards nearby.
This relaxes the objective standard previously necessary to jus-
tify a stop and frisk.
On March 31, 1984, at 11:43 p.m., the silent burglar alarm
at the Baptist Education Center in Charleston, South Carolina
sounded. Officer Smith, patrolling nearby, responded two or
three minutes later. As he approached the center, Smith noticed
Norman Moore, the defendant, walking thirty to forty yards
from its entrance. Smith stopped Moore and, after patting him
down, found a handgun in Moore's pocket. Moore was charged
with possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. The Fourth
Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of Moore's motion to
suppress the handgun, holding that Smith's stop and frisk was
valid.
In reaching its conclusion, the court applied the standards
announced by the United States Supreme Court in the seminal
case of Terry v. Ohio." In Terry the Court first addressed the
standards necessary for police to validly conduct an investigative
stop and frisk. The Court held that the police may stop an indi-
vidual without probable cause if the officers can point to "spe-
cific and articulable facts"" that would lead them to conclude
that the individual was, or was about to be, engaged in criminal
activity. An officer could then frisk that individual if there was
reason to believe that he was armed and dangerous. The Terry
court applied these standards and upheld the validity of the
stop and frisk.5
The Supreme Court continuously has applied the standards
set forth in Terry to cases involving stop and frisk situations.
For example, the Court in United States v. Cortez56 upheld the
stop of the defendant and stated that there must be "some ob-
jective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to
be, engaged in criminal activity. '57 The Court held that this as-
53. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
54. Id. at 21.
55. In Terry a police officer observed two men repeatedly walk past a store and
peer inside. The Court held that the stop and frisk was justified because the officer could
reasonably suspect that the men were contemplating a daytime robbery that likely would
involve the use of weapons. Id. at 1.
56. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
57. Id. at 417 (footnote and citations omitted).
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sessment "must be based upon all the circumstances."" s The
Court also applied the Terry standards in Adams v. Williams."
It held that a stop and frisk is justified when a known informant
advises a police officer that an individual in a nearby vehicle is
armed, and this information is immediately verifiable. The
Court stated that the police officer had ample reason to conclude
that criminal activity was afoot and to "fear for his safety."60
In affirming the trial court's decision in Moore, the court of
appeals applied the standards announced by the Supreme Court
in Terry and its progeny. The court focused on Moore's proxim-
ity to the center's entrance, the time of night, and the previous
history of crime in the area. The court stated that the sounding
of the burglar alarm "provided a reasonable basis for believing
that a burglary had occurred." 1 In reaching this holding, the
court relaxed a stricter objective standard that it had applied
previously and, instead, relied on the subjective perception of
individual officers in cases involving stop and frisk situations.
Previous cases from the Fourth Circuit illustrate the courts'
prior adherence to a strict objective standard.62 For example, in
United States v. Gooding the court of appeals held that an
investigative stop was not based on a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot merely because an in-
dividual arrived from a source city for drugs, appeared nervous,
scanned a concourse after deplaning, and engaged in a game of
mutual surveillance with two drug enforcement agents.
If the court had applied the Terry test to the totality of the
circumstances in Moore, it would have held that the stop and
subsequent frisk was invalid. Instead, the court focused on
Smith's subjective judgment in determining whether the stop
and frisk was warranted. In order for Smith properly to conduct
58. Id. at 418.
69. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
60. Id. at 148.
61. 817 F.2d at 1107.
62. See United States v. Porter, 738 F.2d 622 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
983 (1984) (upheld a stop based on a corroborated anonymous informant's tip that a
particular individual would arrive from Miami with drugs); United States v. Perate, 719
F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1983) (upheld stop and frisk when a chauffeur informed the police
that his passengers possessed drugs and that he feared for his safety); United States v.
LeFevre, 685 F.2d 897 (4th Cir. 1982) (upheld a stop when an officer observed an individ-
ual licking rolling papers, who became nervous upon the officer's approach).
63. 695 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 40
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss1/6
CRIMINAL LAW
an investigative stop, he must have reasonably suspected that
Moore had engaged, or was about to engage, in criminal activity.
Moore gave Smith no indication that he had burglarized, or in-
tended to burglarize, the center. He happened to be walking
nearby as the alarm sounded. In fact, Moore looked as though
he were a resident of the neighborhood, and Smith did not know
him to be otherwise.
Additionally, the frisk could be justified only if Smith had
reason to believe that Moore was armed and dangerous. The
Moore court remarked that a burglary "often involves the use of
weapons."'" Unlike the facts of Terry, however, in which the of-
ficer believed that the suspects were about to commit a robbery
during daylight, Smith suspected that Moore had burglarized
the center in the middle of the night. Moore would not necessa-
rily have carried a gun if he had intended to commit such a
crime. Moreover, Moore's actions did not indicate that he was a
threat to Smith.
Perhaps the court in the present case was following the re-
laxed standards of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
presented in Commonwealth v. Cortez. 5 That court held that a
stop and frisk was valid when, during the early morning, an of-
ficer saw two individuals emerge from an alley with a number of
dogs barking in the background. The court concluded that the
officers reasonably could have suspected that the defendants
were engaged in criminal activity based on the barking of the
dogs. The court stated that "[d]ogs are vigilant of the small par-
cels of the world they call their own. '"" Like the Moore court, it
relied on the officers' subjective assessment in determining that
the stop and frisk was justified rather than objectively relying on
the circumstances as a whole.
In Terry v. Ohio67 the Supreme Court created a narrow ex-
ception to the requirement of probable cause of the fourth
amendment. The Court held that officers could conduct an in-
vestigative stop and frisk if those officers reasonably suspected
that an individual was engaged in criminal activity and was
armed and dangerous. The Fourth Circuit previously had ap-
64. 817 F.2d at 1108.
65. 507 Pa. 529, 491 A.2d 111 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 950 (1985).
66. 507 Pa. at 531, 491 A.2d at 112.
67. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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plied the Terry standard by objectively evaluating the circum-
stances as a whole. The court's decision in Moore, however, illus-
trates that this circuit will apply a less strict standard to cases
involving stop and frisk situations. The court seems willing to
rely on the subjective judgment of an individual officer when
evaluating the validity of a stop and frisk.
Stephanie Ann Holmes
IV. DEFENDANT MAY REQUEST JURY CHARGE DISCLOSING His
PAROLE ELIGIBILITY
The Omnibus Crime Bill of 198668 made several substantive
and procedural changes in South Carolina's capital sentencing
procedures.69 State v. Atkins"0 reflects one aspect of this change.
Until this decision, a jury was not allowed to consider parole eli-
gibility in determining either a defendant's guilt 1 or his sen-
tence. 2 In Atkins the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that
the defendant, under limited conditions, may request a new jury
charge disclosing the possibility and circumstances of his parole.
Joseph Ernest Atkins was convicted of two counts of mur-
der and sentenced to death. 3 On appeal the defendant cited
four errors,74 one being that the trial judge erred in refusing to
68. The Omnibus Criminal Justice Improvements Act of 1986, Act No. 462, 1986
S.C. Acts 2955.
69. Bruck, The Effects of the Omnibus Crime Bill of 1986, in CRIMINAL LAW UP-
DATE: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1986 (S.C. Bar JCLE 1987).
70. 293 S.C. 294, 360 S.E.2d 302 (1987).
71. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 271 S.C. 355, 247 S.E.2d 436 (1978).
72. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 293 S.C. 321, 360 S.E.2d 317 (1987); State v. Peter-
son, 287 S.C. 244, 335 S.E.2d 800 (1985); State v. Norris, 285 S.C. 86, 328 S.E.2d 339
(1985); State v. Atkinson, 253 S.C. 531, 172 S.E.2d 111 (1970), modified, 408 U.S. 936
(1972).
73. Atkins was convicted for murdering Benjamin Atkins, his father, and Fatha
Patterson, a tenant who lived behind his father's duplex. Additionally, Atkins was found
guilty of two counts of assault with intent to kill Fatha Patterson's daughter, Karen
Patterson, and Karen's common law husband, and unlawful possession of pistol. 293 S.C.
294, 295, 360 S.E.2d 302, 303 (1987).
74. Atkins argued that the judge's refusal to submit involuntary manslaughter, as a
possible verdict with respect to the homicide of Karen Patterson, constituted reversible
error. Id. at 298, 360 S.E.2d at 304. The court, however, ruled that the facts of this case
did not support a charge on the lesser included offense.
Atkins' attorney also requested and received a jury charge on assault of a high and
aggravated nature. On appeal the defendant asserted that the trial judge's jury charge
was inadequate on this issue. Id. at 299, 360 S.E.2d at 305. The supreme court agreed
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instruct the jury on the law governing parole considerations in
capital sentencing. The court held that the trial court properly
omitted such instructions but that, henceforth, a defendant
could have this information included in the jury charge. 5 No
reason was given for this decision.
Prior South Carolina cases consistently have held that pa-
role eligibility was not to be discussed with a jury. Atkins relied
on two such cases, State v. Norris6 and State v. Butler.7 7 Norris
held that it was improper to discuss parole eligibility, even if the
jury requested this information. In Butler the court held that
the defendant was properly denied instructions on the possibil-
ity of parole.
Other jurisdictions also have adhered to this principle. 8 As
the South Carolina Supreme Court noted in State v. Brooks,
"[T]he courts of other states that have considered the question
are in near unanimous agreement that ordinarily it is improper
to instruct the jury as to an accused's parole eligibility."
'
Until the passage of the Omnibus Crime Bill, parole eligibil-
ity was relatively liberal. As a result, the general rule prohibiting
that the instructions were inappropriate but that in this case it constituted harmless
error.
Further, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his statutory
right to have his counsel examine prospective jurors prior to their disqualification on the
basis of their opposition to the death penalty. Id. at 296, 360 S.E.2d at 303. The supreme
court agreed and reversed on these grounds.
75. The text of the new jury charge is as follows:
A person who is convicted of murder must be punished by death or by
imprisonment for life. When the state seeks the death penalty and a statutory
aggravating circumstance is specifically found beyond a reasonable doubt, and
a recommendation of death is not made, the trial court must impose a sentence
of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole until the service of thirty
years. When a statutory aggravating circumstance is not found beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment and he
shall not be eligible for parole until the service of twenty years. No person
sentenced under either of the sentencing schemes just explained may receive
any work-release credits, good-time credits, or any other credit that would re-
duce the mandatory imprisonment.
Id. at 300, 360 S.E.2d at 305-06.
76. 285 S.C. 86, 328 S.E.2d 339 (1985).
77. 277 S.C. 543, 290 S.E.2d 420 (1982).
78. But see California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1119
(1985) (holding that it is not unconstitutional for California courts to instruct a jury that
the governor could commute a sentence of life imprisonment without parole).
79. 271 S.C. 355, 359, 247 S.E.2d 436, 438 (1978). See also State v. Butler, 277 S.C.
at 547-48, 290 S.E.2d at 422.
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mention of parole eligibility was enforced to protect the defend-
ant. 0 Now, however, South Carolina law has been amended to
provide minimum and mandatory service requirements before
granting parole. One who is convicted of or pleads guilty to mur-
der is not eligible for parole before serving twenty years."' More-
over, when the state seeks the death penalty and the jury finds
an aggravating circumstance, a defendant is not eligible for pa-
role for at least thirty years.82 Consequently, the defendant pre-
sumably will want this information released, with the expecta-
tion that the jury will more readily impose a sentence of life
imprisonment rather than death.
In Atkins the defendant advanced two arguments in favor
of including the parole eligibility charge. Conceding that the
general rule would not allow the requested instructions, Atkins
alleged that the facts in this case merited different treatment
and that instructions addressing parole eligibility should be
given when the evidence itself creates the inference that the de-
fendant will be eligible for parole if not executed. 3 Here, the
jury may have known that the defendant was out on parole at
the time of the crimes.8 4 This, the defense asserted, created exi-
gent circumstances warranting the jury charge.
Second, the defense also argued that under Skipper v.
South Carolinas5 and State v. Patterson8 1 the court was consti-
80. State v. Brooks, 271 S.C. 355, 247 S.E.2d 436 (1978), reversed a murder convic-
tion because the judge included information in the jury charge that the defendant would
be eligible for parole after serving one-third of any sentence imposed. The supreme court
held, "We are of the view appellant was entitled to have his guilt or innocence deter-
mined without regard to his eligibility for parole. A jury should be neither invited nor
permitted to speculate upon the possible effects of parole upon a conviction." Id. at 359,
247 S.E.2d at 438 (citing State v. Atkinson, 253 S.C. 531, 172 S.E.2d 111 (1970), modi-
fied, 408 U.S. 936 (1972), and State v. Pulley, 216 S.C. 552, 59 S.E.2d 155 (1950)).
81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
82. Id.
83. Brief of Appellant at 28 (emphasis in original).
84. Id. at 25-28. The prosecution, however, asserted that although this parole infor-
mation was printed in the newspaper after arrest, the voir dire examination revealed
that nine of the twelve jurors selected had never heard of the case before and the other
three did not remember anything about it. Brief of Respondent at 21.
85. 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (United States Supreme Court reversed death penalty be-
cause the lower courts' refusal to admit evidence concerning the defendant's future
adaptability to prison life was violative of the eighth amendment). See infra note 92 and
accompanying text.
86. 290 S.C. 523, 351 S.E.2d 853 (1986) (basing its decision on Skipper, supreme
court reversed a death penalty because of trial court's exclusion of the defendant's evi-
[Vol. 4-0
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tutionally obligated to provide accurate parole information to
the jury. These cases held that in a death penalty situation, the
sentencer should have before him all relevant facts. The defend-
ant admitted that Skipper concerned the admission of evidence,
rather than the furnishing of accurate legal information, but hy-
pothesized that the Supreme Court would have reached the
same result in this case.
The court did not address these arguments in its opinion.
Instead, Justice Harwell cited Norris and Butler in approving
the trial court's decision not to include parole eligibility in its
jury charge. 8 In a clear break from precedent, the decision went
on to change the rule for death penalty cases controlled by the
Omnibus Crime Bill that proceed to trial "after this opinion is
published."89
Atkins is limited strictly to defendants brought to trial
under the Omnibus Crime Bill. The defendant retains the option
of submitting the jury charge previously used: that the term
"life imprisonment" is to be understood in its plain and ordinary
meaning without consideration given to possibility of early
parole.90
Atkins rightfully follows the judicial trend set by Lockett v.
Ohio91 and Skipper v. South Carolina92 allowing broad latitude
to the defendant to present all relevant facts to the sentencer in
capital cases. Furthermore, the Omnibus Crime Bill's mandatory
thirty-year minimum sentence for murder with aggravating cir-
cumstances, as found in this case, greatly reduces any specula-
dence regarding future adaptability to prison life). See infra note 92 and accompanying
text.
87. Brief of Appellant at 29.
88. 293 S.C. at 300, 360 S.E.2d at 305.
89. Id. The probable reason for excluding Atkins from this decision is that the
effective date of the Omnibus Crime Bill was several months after the crime but twenty-
four days before the sentencing hearing. Brief of Appellant at 26 n.4. The defendant,
however, had agreed to waive any ex post facto objection in return for the requested jury
instructions. Record at 850-51. On the other hand, the court was not constitutionally
required to make this decision, so it could rightfully exclude Atkins from its holding. See
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1001 (1983).
90. 293 S.C. at 300, 360 S.E.2d at 305.
91. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) Lockett held that the eighth and fourteenth amendments
require a sentencing judge to consider, as mitigating factors, "any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant prof-
fers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Id. at 604.
92. 476 U.S. at 1. See supra note 85.
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tive nature in parole consideration.93 State v. Atkins, therefore,
gives South Carolina capital defendants a progressive and equi-
table alternative to the former denial of parole information to
juries.
Elizabeth Scott Mo'se
V. JURY INSTRUCTIONS MUST BE CAST SO THAT JURIES WILL
INTERPRET PRESUMPTIONS AS PERMISSIVE
In State v. Adams9 4 the South Carolina Supreme Court re-
versed the appellant's convictions of possession of valium and
hashish and possession of marijuana and cocaine with intent to
distribute because of the trial judge's erroneous charge to the
jury.95 The court found two defects in the trial court's charge.
First, because the amounts of cocaine and marijuana were insuf-
ficient to raise the statutory presumption of an intent to dis-
tribute,"' the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on
simple possession with intent to distribute.9 Second, the trial
court incorrectly charged the jury that articles in a dwelling
house "must be deemed to be in the constructive possession of
the person controlling the house in the absence of evidence to
the contrary."9' The court held that the jury could have inter-
preted this language to require the appellant to rebut the state's
evidence.9
On the issue of whether the trial court should charge a
lesser included offense, the court said, "[a] trial judge must
charge a lesser included offense if there is evidence from which
it can be inferred that the defendant committed the lesser
rather than the greater offense."100 The wording of the rule is
93. See Bruck, supra note 69, at 69.
94. 291 S.C. 132, 352 S.E.2d 483 (1987).
95. Adams' convictions were based on items seized from his home pursuant to a
search warrant. Among the items introduced into evidence were a large inventory of drug
paraphernalia, weapons, $134,000 in cash, and small amounts of controlled substances.
96. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(d)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1976)(possession of ten grains
(.6480 grams) of cocaine and twenty-eight grams or one ounce of marijuana raises the
presumption of possession with intent to distribute these drugs). Law enforcement of-
ficers seized .1853 grams of cocaine and 5.29 grams of marijuana from Adams' home.
97. 291 S.C. at 135, 352 S.E.2d at 485-86.
98. Id., 352 S.E.2d at 486 (emphasis added).
99. Id.
100. Id., 352 S.E.2d at 485.
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clearer in Adams than in State v. Mickle, °1 in which the South
Carolina Supreme Court said that "[i]t is only necessary to
charge a lesser included offense when there is evidence tending
to show that only such lesser crime was committed. ' 10 2 The un-
ambiguous phrasing of the rule in Adams makes clear that com-
pelling or conclusive evidence on a lesser offense is not a prereq-
uisite to obtaining a charge on a lesser included offense.-'
The only basis for the supreme court's requiring a charge on
simple possession was the fact that the state narcotics agents
had not found statutory amounts of marijuana and cocaine.104
Evidence that the defendant possessed less than the statutory
amount is "evidence from which it can be inferred that the de-
fendant committed the lesser rather than the greater offense.
1 05
Thus, any defendant found to possess a controlled substance in
an amount less than that which triggers the statutory presump-
tion of intent to distribute should be entitled to a charge on sim-
ple possession, regardless of other evidence indicating intent to
distribute.
The trial court's charge on constructive possession106 was er-
roneous because the instruction could have been interpreted as
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, requiring him "to
disprove possession which is an element of the offense
charged.10 7  Such a shift of the burden of proof is
unconstitutional.108
The trial court's instruction was phrased in compliance with
State v. Ellis,09 which was no longer valid. The proper charge,
101. 273 S.C. 71, 254 S.E.2d 295 (1987).
102. Id. at 73, 254 S.E.2d at 296.
103. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 15.
104. 291 S.C. at 135, 352 S.E.2d at 485-86.
105. Id., 352 S.E.2d at 485.
106. Id., 352 S.E.2d at 486.
107. Id.
108. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979) ("A presumption which
... had the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant" would have
violated his right to due process of law). According to In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970),
the due process clause requires that, in order to obtain a conviction of the accused, the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged.
The state cannot shift this burden of proof to the defendant by means of a presumption.
See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 524 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 214 (1977)).
109. 263 S.C. 12, 22, 207 S.E.2d 408, 413 (1974) ("Ordinarily, when articles are in a
dwelling house they must be deemed to be in the constructive possession of the person
controlling the house in the absence of evidence to the contrary.")(quoting 22 C.J.S.
1988]
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according to the supreme court, should have been styled as a
permissive inference, which the jury would be free to accept or
reject, following its view of the evidence.110 The trial court
should have "instruct[ed] the jury that the defendant's knowl-
edge and possession may be inferred if the substance was found
on premises under his control."'
The United States Supreme Court dealt with the various
types of presumptions in criminal proceedings in Sandstrom v.
Montana"2 and County Court of Ulster County v. Allen."3 The
type of presumption in a given case is customarily determined
by the trial court's instructions to the jury, " 4 and different tests
of constitutionality are used for different types of presump-
tions.115 Yet the guiding principle in determining whether a pre-
Criminal Law § 597)(1961)).
110. 291 S.C. at 135-36, 352 S.E.2d at 486. ("The trial judge should explain to the
jury that it is free to accept or reject this permissive inference of knowledge and posses-
sion depending upon its view of the evidence."). Id.
111. Id. at 135, 352 S.E.2d at 486 (emphasis added).
112. 442 U.S. 510 (1979). Since the presumption in Sandstrom could have inter-
preted in either of two ways, see infra note 114, the Court analyzed it as both a conclu-
sive presumption that required the fact finder to find the presumed fact once the basic
fact was proved and as a mandatory presumption that shifted the burden of persuasion
to the defendant.
113. 442 U.S. 140 (1979). In Allen the Supreme Court divided presumptions into
two general categories - permissive inferences or presumptions, and mandatory pre-
sumptions. 442 U.S. at 157. Mandatory presumptions were subdivided into two clas-
ses-production-shifting presumptions and proof-shifting presumptions. Id. at 157 n.16.
114. Id. at 158 n.16. In Allen the Court found that the presumption involved was a
permissive inference because of the trial judge's instruction that the jury could ignore
the presumption involved "even if there was no affirmative proof offered by defendants
in rebuttal." Id. at 160-61.
In Sandstrom the court examined a jury instruction that "the law presumes that a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." 442 U.S. at 517. The
Court held that the instruction was unconstitutional because a reasonable juror could
have viewed such an instruction as either a mandatory burden-shifting presumption or
as a conclusive presumption. Id. at 524.
115. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 347, at 988 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). In analyz-
ing a permissive inference, a court should refer to the facts of the case. See Allen, 442
U.S. at 162-63. If, in the context of the facts of the case, there is no rational connection
between the proved and the presumed fact, then the presumption must be found viola-
tive of due process. The test of rationality is whether "it can at least be said with sub-
stantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved
fact." Id. at 166 n.28. A "rational connection" test for presumptions in criminal cases was
developed in Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). This test was further defined in
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), to include the"more likely than not" stan-
dard. See MCCORMCK § 347, at 991-95.
On the other hand, the constitutionality of either a conclusive presumption or a
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sumption is constitutional "remains constant." The Supreme
Court stated in Allen: "[T]he device must not undermine the
factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by
the state, to find the facts beyond a reasonable doubt."
116
The South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized the dis-
tinctions between permissive inferences and mandatory pre-
sumptions. 1" 7 When faced with an instruction that could be in-
persuasion-shifting presumption is to be judged on its face. See Allen, 442 U.S. at 158;
Sandstrom, 442 U.S. 510. If a reasonable juror could conclude that such a presumption
either (1) in the case of a conclusive presumption, absolutely requires a finding of the
presumed fact once the basic fact is proved or (2) in the case of a persuasion-shifting
presumption, requires a finding of the presumed fact unless the defendant disproves the
presumed fact, then the presumption violates the defendant's right to due process of law.
Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523-24. Such a presumption relieves the prosecution of its bur-
den of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a crime. Id. See also supra
note 108.
116. Allen, 442 U.S. at 156. The differing tests for permissive inferences and
mandatory presumptions, supra note 114, may be explained in terms of this guiding
principle. Because a permissive inference may be accepted or rejected by the fact finder,
"it affects the application of the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard only if, under the
facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted
by the inference." Id. at 157. Thus, permissive inferences are tested with reference to the
facts of the case. On the other hand, "[a] mandatory presumption is a far more trouble-
some evidentiary device." Id. It affects not only the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard but also the placement of the burden of proof. Therefore, it is appropriate to
test a presumption that poses such a threat to due process on its face. Id. at 157-58.
117. W. McANINCH & W. FAiREY, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA 39 (1982).
The court, however, seems not to have expressly recognized the distinctions between pre-
sumptions that shift the burden of proof and presumptions that shift the burden of pro-
duction. See supra note 113. The court has stated that the "burden of explanation"
should not be placed on the defendant, and without further defining "burden of explana-
tion," has proceeded to analyze the presumption at issue as a burden-shifting presump-
tion. See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 279 S.C. 301, 302, 306 S.E.2d 598, 599 (1983).
Ignoring this distinction, however, is probably prudent. According to one writer,
"The status of presumptions that shift the burden of production to the defendant is
unclear." Note, After Sandstrom: The Constitutionality of Presumptions That Shift the
Burden of Production, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 519, 522 (1981). A South Carolina writer has
stated, "The only acceptable mandatory or rebuttable presumption is one that merely
shifts the burden of production, not the burden of persuasion." W. McANINCH & W.
FAIREY, supra note 117, at 38. In Allen the United States Supreme Court suggested that
presumptions imposing very slight burdens of production may be analyzed as permissive
inferences. 442 U.S. at 158 n.16. In another case, however, the Court expressly noted that
it offered no opinion on production-shifting presumptions. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S.
307, 314 n.3 (1985). By refusing to recognize production-shifting presumptions, the
South Carolina Supreme Court avoids the confusion that seems to surround it.
Furthermore, the court's position may offer greater protection for defendants' due
process rights. In Note, supra note 117, the author argued that jurors are likely to misin-
terpret instructions designed to create production-shifting presumptions, and that even
if jurors accurately interpret production shifting presumptions, these devices remain of
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terpreted by the jury "as requiring the defendant to personally
rebut or explain,"' 18 the court has reversed convictions, observ-
ing that the terms "presumption," "rebuttable," and "reasonable
explanation" should be deleted from jury instructions and re-
placed by terms such as "might infer" or "may be presumed.""' 9
As the court noted in reversing Adam's convictions, "The trial
judge should explain to the jury that it is free to accept or reject
this permissive inference. . . depending upon its view of the ev-
idence."' 20 Thus, the South Carolina court makes clear that the
court should always cast jury instructions regarding presump-
tions so that juries will interpret presumptions as permissive
and so that constitutional problems may therefore be avoided.
121
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court does not en-
gage in the fine line-drawing that marks cases like Allen and
Sandstrom, the court's holdings share with these cases a focus
on jurors' possible interpretations of a trial court's instructions.
Although the court's approach may be more liberal than is con-
stitutionally required,"22 this approach is faithful to the guiding
principle of the tests in Allen and Sandstrom, namely the pres-
ervation of the integrity of the fact finder's responsibility.
B. Rush Smith, III
VI. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NOT NEEDED TO EXPLAIN GUILTY
BUT MENTALLY ILL VERDICT
In State v. Bell 23 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on
the sentencing procedure for the guilty but mentally ill verdict,
despite defense arguments that the solicitor had misled jurors
into believing such a verdict might result in a lighter sentence.
dubious constitutionality.
118. Cooper, 279 S.C. at 302, 306 S.E.2d at 599.
119. State v. Peterson, 287 S.C. 244, 247, 335 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1985). See also
Cooper, 279 S.C. 301, 306 S.E.2d 598.
120. 291 S.C. at 135-36, 352 S.E.2d at 486.
121. Similarly, in 1987 the South Carolina General Assembly amended sections of
the 1976 Code to read as permissive inferences. See 1987 S.C. Acts 195 (amending S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-240, -11-820, -13-120, -13-130, -13-220, -14-90, -15-300, -17-230; 56-5-
2950(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976)).
122. See supra note 117.
123. 293 S.C. 391, 360 S.E.2d 706 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 735 (1988).
[Vol. 40
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The court rejected several other defense arguments as well12 in
affirming the murder and kidnapping conviction and capital sen-
tence of Larry Gene Bell.
At trial the defense conceded Bell's criminal responsibil-
ity.125 The primary issue thus became whether Bell was either
guilty or guilty but mentally ill.12" In South Carolina, a verdict
of guilty but mentally ill results in the same options of punish-
ment as a verdict of guilty.127 The distinction is that before im-
position of sentence, the State commits the guilty but mentally
ill convict to a mental treatment facility. He remains there until
the facility's staff determines that his condition has improved
sufficiently so that his sentence may be carried out, even if that
sentence is death. 2 ' To require a state to "cure" a convict before
it kills him seems bizarre. For this and other reasons, commenta-
tors have sharply criticized the guilty but mentally ill doc-
trine; ' 2  nevertheless, it has withstood several constitutional
challenges. 30
Throughout trial, the State sought to dismiss Bell's history
of abnormal behavior as successfully calculated ploys to escape
punishment for his criminal acts.' 3' During closing arguments
the solicitor asserted that a verdict of guilty but mentally ill
would be a "trophy" and a "reward" for Bell. 3 2 The defense
contended that such remarks may have misled jurors into believ-
ing that a guilty but mentally ill verdict would result in a lighter
124. Other defense challenges included questions concerning a defendant's compe-
tency to stand trial, the sixth amendment right to public trial, the admissibility of evi-
dence of a victim's social worth and the impact of a crime on the victim's family, the
right to be present at one's trial, and the limits of propriety regarding a solicitor's closing
remarks.
125. Record at 3447, 3453.
126. Brief of Appellant at 26.
127. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-20, 17-24-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1987).
128. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 359 (2d ed. 1986); W. MCANINCH &
W. FAIREY, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA 317 (Supp. 1986). See also State v.
Harris, 499 N.E.2d 723 (Ind. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2490 (1987) (guilty but men-
tally ill verdict does not preclude imposition of death penalty). But see Ford v. Wain-
wright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2603 (1986)(eighth amendment held to prohibit the execution of
the insane; procedures to determine sanity as prerequisite to execution must satisfy "no
less stringent standards than those demanded in any other aspect of a capital
proceeding").
129. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 128, at 359-60.
130. Id. at 359.
131. See Record at 2670, 2672, 2674, 2676, 3215, 3223.
132. Id. at 3440.
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sentence than a guilty verdict.13 3 The defense urged the trial
court to clarify this misperception by instructing the jury that
"[t]he finding of either verdict still allows the jury to consider a
sentence of life imprisonment or death"1las The trial judge
refused. 130
In upholding this decision, the supreme court failed to ad-
dress the essential argument that the trial judge had allowed the
State to mislead the jury. Instead, the supreme court relied on
general statements that penalty information is "of no aid" and
"not relevant" to a jury during the guilt phase of a bifurcated
trial.136 Such a position reasonably might be founded on fears of
jury confusion or compromise. 137 In Bell, however, the defense
argued, in essence, that the jury was already confused; clarifica-
tion of the penalty procedure was necessary to dispel an already
existing danger of compromise based on a misconception of the
guilty but mentally ill verdict as a "reward.
1 38
Even in the absence of a misleading prosecutorial state-
ment, the doctrine that jurors have no concern with the conse-
quences of a verdict is not without exceptions. In Lyle v. United
States,3 9 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that
when jurors commonly know the consequences of two verdict op-
tions, they have "a right to know" the consequences of a third
on which they are unclear. 40 The Supreme Court of Indiana has
recognized the inherent confusion facing a jury in cases involv-
ing a defendant's mental state:
There will be increased speculation on the part of the jury
on the differences in sentencing between verdicts of guilty,
guilty but mentally ill and not responsible by reason of in-
133. Brief of Appellant at 31-36.
134. Record at 4204-05.
135. Instead, the trial judge included the following in his charge: "[Tihere is another
possible verdict in this case and this is not a defense. It is guilty, but mentally ill ...
[I]t is a form of guilty verdict." Record at 3509.
136. 293 S.C. at 399, 360 S.E.2d at 710.
137. See Brief of Respondent at 42.
138. During closing argument, defense counsel told the jury that the guilty but men-
tally ill verdict did not relieve a defendant from criminal responsibility. Record at 3451,
3454.
139. 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
140. Id. at 728. See also W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 128, at 359 ("It does not
make sense that a jury should be presented with three verdict choices. . . but know the
consequences of only the first two.").
[Vol. 40
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sanity. In order to dispel the speculation and to focus the jury
on the issue of guilt, rather than possible punishment, an in-
struction explaining the consequences of each determination in
a general way can be appropriate and beneficial to the
accused.14'
An erroneous belief that a guilty but mentally ill verdict will
result in a light sentence could persuade a jury to impose a ver-
dict of guilty, for jurors "abhor setting free a defendant where
the evidence establishes guilt of a serious crime. ' 142 In Turner v.
Murray143 the Supreme Court found "the risk that racial
prejudice may have infected petitioner's capital sentencing unac-
ceptable in light of the ease with which that risk could have
been minimized.' 1 44 It is equally unacceptable that a risk of jury
misperceptions infect a verdict determination in light of the ease
with which that risk could be minimized by a clarifying charge
from the trial judge.
Of course, the supreme court may have believed that the
solicitor's remarks did not mislead the jury; or that the trial
judge, in the charge he delivered, reasonably dispelled any con-
fusion; or that, the damage being done, any comment by the
judge would only further becloud the issue. Whatever it be-
lieved, the court rested this part of its opinion on summary pro-
nouncements of law that avoided the essential question of jury
confusion.
Daniel J. Westbrook
VII. PEARCE RULE NOT APPLICABLE IF HARSHER SENTENCE IS
IMPOSED BY A DIFFERENT JUDGE THAN ONE WHO HANDED DOWN
THE INITIAL SENTENCE
In State v. Hilton'4 the Supreme Court of South Carolina
limited the generally recognized146 presumption of vindictiveness
141. State v. Smith, 502 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Ind. 1987).
142. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642 (1980) (quoting Jacobs v. State, 361 So. 2d
640, 651-52 (Ala. 1978)).
143. 106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986).
144. Id. at 1688.
145. 291 S.C. 276, 353 S.E.2d 282 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 106 (1987).
146. See Hewell v. State, 238 Ga. 578, 234 S.E.2d 497 (1977) (an increase in defend-
ant's sentence, absent a finding of conduct occurring after the original sentence, is a
denial of due process); State v. Wise, 425 So. 2d 727 (La. 1983) (when there is no new
19881
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rule established by the United States Supreme Court in North
Carolina v. Pearce.146 The Pearce rule was designed to prevent
judges from imposing harsher sentences on defendants because
they had sucessfully overturned a prior conviction. In Hilton the
court held that the presumption does not apply when the subse-
quent harsher sentence is imposed by a different judge.
Hilton was convicted of assault and battery with intent to
kill and was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. The South Car-
olina Court of Appeals reversed that conviction, holding that the
trial judge should have submitted to the jury the lesser offense
of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature. In the
second trial, Hilton was again convicted of assault and battery
with intent to kill. The second judge sentenced Hilton to twenty
years in prison. On appeal the supreme court held that the
Pearce presumption of vindictiveness did not apply.
In Pearce the United States Supreme Court held that the
due process clause requires that vindictiveness must not play a
role in the sentencing of a defendant who has sucessfully at-
tacked a prior conviction. The Court announced a prophylatic
rule: "[W]henever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon
a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must
affirmatively appear. 1 47 The Court placed the burden of proof
on the judge who delivered the second sentence. If his reasons
for the harsher sentence were not "based on objective informa-
tion concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defend-
ant occurring after the time of the original [sentence]," there
was a presumption that vindictiveness played a role in the sen-
tencing process.
1 48
In Hilton the record does not reveal any additional informa-
tion that the second sentencing judge considered when he im-
posed a harsher sentence. The court considered the victim's dis-
ability, which had not changed since the previous sentence was
imposed.149 The judge handed down the maximum sentence of
twenty years because he personally felt for the victim who was
behavior to justify an increased sentence, defendant's right to due process is violated);
State v. Eden, 163 W. Va. 370, 256 S.E.2d 868 (1979) (a defendant who receives a heavier
penalty than he had originally is denied due process).
146. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
147. Id. at 726.
148. Id.
149. Record at 49.
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severely injured: "It's more horrible that he lived than if he had
died."' It is clear that if the Pearce rule had been applied here,
the judge's sentence would have been presumed vindictive.
In holding that the Pearce presumption did not apply, the
court cited a number of cases to support the propositions that
Pearce has been limited many times and that the natural pro-
gression would be to hold the rule inapplicable when the second
harsher sentence is handed down by a different judge. The
United States Supreme Court has held the Pearce presumption
inapplicable in certain situations. For example, in Colten v.
Kentucky 5' the Court held that the presumption did not apply
to Kentucky's two-tiered system in which a defendant may re-
ceive a trial de novo. Similarly, the Court has held the Pearce
rule inapplicable when a jury, which has not been informed of a
prior sentence, imposes a second harsher sentence.'52 It seems,
however, that in these two situations, vindictiveness is unlikely
to play a role in resentencing.
5
3
In some of the cases cited in Hilton in which courts have
held that the Pearce presumption did not apply, that holding
was not intended to limit the Pearce rule.'" The facts in those
cases were such that there could be no presumption of
vindictiveness.
Practically, the decision in Hilton has a chilling effect on
150. Id. at 57. "The victim suffered severe permanent brain damage as a result of
the impact, and was unable to make a statement concerning the incident." 291 S.C. at
277, 353 S.E.2d at 283.
151. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
152. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
153. In Chaffin the first trial took place in an inferior court, and the second trial
occurred in a court of general jurisdiction. The defendant, therefore, received a fresh
determination of guilt or innocence. In this situation, the second sentencer has little or
no motivation to punish a defendant for a prior successful appeal. Similarly, it seems
implausible that a jury that has not been informed about a defendant's prior sentence
would vindictively resentence that defendant for a successful appeal.
154. In Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986), the judge imposed a second sen-
tence that was twenty years greater than the previous jury sentence. The Pearce pre-
sumption, however, did not apply in this case because "the second sentencer provid[ed]
an on-the-record, wholly logical, nonvindictive reason for the longer sentence." Id. at
140. This is exactly what the Pearce rule prescribes. Also, in Brown v. District Court,
Nassau County, 637 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), the defendant's second sentence was
no greater "than originally imposed." Id. at 1099. He was not reconvicted after success-
fully having his trial put aside; his conviction was unanimously affirmed. These were not
situations in which the court limited presumptions of vindictiveness. Therefore, that pre-
sumption did not apply to those facts.
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those defendants who would appeal their convictions. The
Pearce rule was designed to avoid exactly this effect; vindictive-
ness should not impede the defendant's right to appeal. The
Pearce rule places the burden of proof on the defendant because
it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a convicted defendant
to prove that a more severe sentence was a product of a judge's
displeasure regarding his successful appeal of a prior conviction.
In fact, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia stated in
State v. Eden 55 that "requiring a showing of vindictiveness mo-
tivation places too heavy a burden on the defendant. 1 56 The
South Carolina Supreme Court does not address ways that a de-
fendant might surmount this task. It seems far more equitable
to place this burden on the judge who imposes the greater
sentence.
Finally, the Hilton court made two other assumptions in
concluding that the Pearce rule should not apply in this case.
First, the court assumed that vindictiveness cannot occur when a
harsher sentence is imposed by a different judge. Second, the
court assumed that only sentencing bodies are capable of vindic-
tiveness against a defendant who has successfully appealed a
prior conviction. In reality, these assumptions may not be valid
and may deter defendants from rightfully appealing their
convictions. 57
Stephanie Ann Holmes
VIII. SELF-DEFENSE No LONGER MUST BE PROVED FOR
AQuiTTAL
South Carolina's new rule regarding proof of self-defense
was set out in State v. Bellamy.15 8 Self-defense is no longer an
affirmative defense that the defendant must prove by a pre-
poderance of the evidence. Now a defendant need only produce
evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt in or-
155. 163 W. Va. 370, 256 S.E.2d 868 (1979).
156. Id. at 386, 256 S.E.2d at 877 (citing Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 641
(4th Cir. 1967)), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968).
157. It is possible that a second judge might penalize a defendant for successfully
appealing a conviction over which a colleague presided. It is also plausible that a solici-
tor, who has some control over the docket, might want to punish a successful appellant
by scheduling the case before a judge who is a notoriously harsh sentencer.
158. 293 S.C. 103, 359 S.E.2d 63 (1987).
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der to be acquitted.15
Bellamy was convicted of criminal conspiracy and the mur-
der of Roland Vereen. Bellamy shot Vereen five times in the
head. The state contended that Bellamy's codefendant had hired
him to kill Vereen. Bellamy contended that he had refused his
codefendant's requests to kill Vereen and had acted in self-de-
fense, firing only after Vereen pulled a gun on him.6 °
The trial court, after defining the four elements of self-de-
fense, instructed the jury that the defendant must show by "the
preponderance or the greater weight of the evidence" that he
acted in self-defense.'' The supreme court held the portion of
the charge relating to Bellamy's burden of proof to be error and
reversed the conviction.
16 2
In describing the proper charge on proof of self-defense, the
court stated, "It is clear that the defendant need not establish
self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence but must
merely produce evidence which causes the jury to have a reason-
able doubt regarding his guilt.' 6 3 The court quoted the appro-
priate language from the model charge set out in State v.
Davis:'"
If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after
considering all the evidence including the evidence of self-de-
fense, then you must find him not guilty. On the other hand, if
you have no reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after
considering all the evidence including the evidence of self-de-
fense then you must find him guilty." 5
The court stated that this charge was "made mandatory"'
6'
by the South Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Glover.6 7 The
159. Id. at 105, 359 S.E.2d at 64-65.
160. Id. at 104, 359 S.E.2d at 64.
161. Id. at 105, 359 S.E.2d at 64.
162. Id. at 105-06, 359 S.E.2d at 65.
163. Id. at 105, 359 S.E.2d at 65 (citing W. McANINCH & W. FAIIEY, THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA 101 (Supp. 1986) ("[Slelf-defense is no longer to be considered
an affirmative defense which must be established by the defendant by a preponderance
of the evidence .... [I]f any reasonable doubt remains as to self-defense, the jury must
acquit.").
164. 282 S.C. 45, 317 S.E.2d 452 (1984).
165. 293 S.C. at 105, 359 S.E.2d at 64 (citing State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 46, 317
S.E.2d 452, 453 (1984)).
166. 293 S.C. at 105, 359 S.E.2d at 64.
167. 284 S.C. 152, 326 S.E.2d 150 (1985), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1068 (1985).
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Glover court stated that "the charge approved in Davis shall be
applied in all cases tried subsequent to the date of that decision,
so long as a contemporaneous objection was made at trial."1' 5
This rule seems to have been a response to Thomas v. Leeke,ls9
in which the Fourth Circuit reversed denial of relief to a habeas
corpus petitioner on the ground that the trial court's instruc-
tions regarding burden of proof were contradictory to the point
of constitutional infirmity. 70 In Glover, although the court ad-
hered to the view that the due process principles articulated in
In re Winship"' were not offended by charging self-defense as
an affirmative defense, a view expressed in both the Thomas dis-
sent 7 2 and a line of South Carolina cases,17 3 the court neverthe-
less noted that the constitutional violation in Thomas had been
cured by Davis.7 4 The court then mandated the use of the Davis
charge prospectively. 175
The constitutionality of charging self-defense as an affirma-
tive defense was confirmed by the recent case of Martin v.
Ohio.170 In Martin the United States Supreme Court rejected
168. Id. at 154, 326 S.E.2d at 150.
169. 725 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984).
170. The problematic contradiction in Thomas lay in charging the jury on the one
hand that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was felonious
and, therefore, unlawful, and on the other hand that the defendant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the killing was in self-defense and, therefore, lawful.
Id. at 250-51.
In Davis, decided more than five months after Thomas, the court did not cite
Thomas nor any other case in support of its new charge on self-defense. Indeed, Davis
offers no reason at all for its new formulation of the proper charge on self-defense.
In Glover the court did not explore the rationale of Thomas but noted that the old
charge on self-defense had "come under a recent attack" in that case. 284 S.C. at 153,
326 S.E.2d at 151. The court then held the Davis charge mandatory. See infra notes 174,
175 and accompanying text.
171. 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
every element of the offense).
172. 725 F.2d at 252-54. In addition, the majority declined to hold that defining self-
defense as an affirmative defense offended due process. See id. at 249-50.
173. See State v. Hardy, 283 S.C. 590, 325 S.E.2d 320 (1985); State v. Finley, 277
S.C. 548, 290 S.E.2d 808 (1982); State v. Griffin, 277 S.C. 193, 285 S.E.2d 631 (1981);
State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 278 S.E.2d 335 (1981); State v. Coker, 272 S.C. 344, 251
S.E.2d 764 (1979); State v. McDowell, 272 S.C. 203, 249 S.E.2d 916 (1978); State v. Atch-
ison, 268 S.C. 588, 235 S.E.2d 294, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 894 (1977); State v. Bolton, 266
S.C. 444, 223 S.E.2d 863 (1976).
174. 284 S.C. at 154, 236 S.E.2d at 151.
175. Id.
176. 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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the proposition that requiring a defendant to prove self-defense
by a preponderance of the evidence shifted from the state its
burden of proving guilt of aggravated murder beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.177 Thus, a state may define self-defense as an affirma-
tive defense without violating due process. 8
In Bellamy the state argued that based on Martin, the trial
court's charge was within constitutional bounds.' 79 The South
Carolina Supreme Court had held accordingly in many cases. 180
The Bellamy court, however, summarily rejected this argument:
"While the charge may be constitutionally permissible, it does
not comport with South Carolina law."' 18'
This rejection of the proposition that Martin should define
South Carolina law is significant not only because it indicates
that the court may guard the principles of Winship more jeal-
ously than does the United States Supreme Court, but also be-
cause it implicitly renders inoperable a body of South Carolina
177. Id. at - The burden-shifting argument is based on Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684 (1975). The Court held that requiring the defendant to prove provocation by a
preponderance of the evidence in order to reduce the degree of homicide served to re-
lieve the state of its beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden as defined in In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970).
According to Winship, due process requires that the prosecution must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged. If a defense negates an element
of the offense, then requiring the defendant to prove that defense is equivalent to requir-
ing him to disprove an element of the offense. Such a shift of the burden of proof is
impermissible. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. 684; Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
178. The instructions in Martin were similar to those in Thomas v. Leeke, 725 F.2d
246 (4th Cir. 1984), insofar as the jury was charged that the state had the burden of
proving all elements of aggravated murder beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the de-
fendant could be acquitted if she proved self-defense by preponderance of the evidence.
The Court noted that "[t]he instructions in this case could be clearer in this respect,"
but found no constitutional infirmity in the apparent contradiction. "[W]hen read as a
whole, we think [the instructions] are adequate to convey to the jury that all of the
evidence, including the evidence going to self-defense, must be considered in deciding
whether there was a reasonable doubt about the sufficiency of the state's proof of the
elements of the crime." 480 U.S. at _. The deference to state law demonstrated in
Martin was also apparent in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), a case that
indicates the narrow limits of the argument on which Mullaney is based. See supra note
177. In Patterson the Court held that due process was not violated by New York's re-
quiring the defendant to prove emotional disturbance by a preponderance of the evi-
dence in order to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter. New York's definition
of murder determined the outcome.
179. 293 S.C. at 105, 359 S.E.2d at 65.
180. See cases cited supra note 173 and accompanying text.
181. 293 S.C. at 105, 359 S.E.2d at 65.
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law. If Martin does not determine state law, then neither should
State v. Bolton,"'2 in which the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that South Carolina's definition of self-defense as an affirm-
ative defense does not offend due proces.155 The rule that self-
defense is not an affirmative defense is thus fortified.8 4
As a result of this new rule, if a defendant produces evi-
dence of self-defense sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of his
guilt, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not act in self-defense. Such a result, though per-
haps more onerous for the state, assures that the defendant will
not be convicted by a jury that might harbor reasonable doubt
of his guilt, specifically in a case in which defendant's proof of
self-defense did not rise to the level of the preponderance of the
evidence but did raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt. Further-
more, since the South Carolina definitions of murder and man-
slaughter include elements of unlawfulness 8 5 and self-defense
182. 266 S.C. 444, 223 S.E.2d 863 (1976).
183. Later cases have affirmed this holding. See supra note 173 and accompanying
text.
184. If the supreme court had not so unequivocally stated that the constitutionally
permissible charge did not comport with state law, the Bolton line of cases might have
been perceived as a threat to the viability of the Davis charge. In State v. Hardy, 283
S.C. 590, 325 S.E.2d 320 (1985), a decision handed down scarcely more than two weeks
prior to Glover, the court upheld the constitutionality of a charge that defined self-de-
fense as an affirmative defense and also held that the charge "substantially embrace[d]
all the elements of the Davis charge and that the charge [was] neither contradictory nor
confusing." Id. at 593, 325 S.E.2d at 322.
Martin confirmed the validity of the Bolton holding with respect to the constitu-
tionality of defining self-defense as an affirmative defense. At the same time, Martin
arguably diminished the force of Thomas v. Leeke, 725 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1984). See
supra notes 170, 178 and accompanying text.
If Martin weakened Thomas, then there would be little or no remaining basis for the
Glover holding that made mandatory the Davis charge. See supra note 170 and accom-
panying text. Since it is constitutionally permissible to define self-defense as an affirma-
tive defense, there is no reason to define it otherwise. The court's rejection of Martin
suggests that such an argument may fail in South Carolina. The conclusion of this argu-
ment might be sound, but it would not comport with state law.
There are very good reasons for the present South Carolina rule as expressed in
Bellamy. Basically requiring a defendant to prove self-defense by a preponderance of the
evidence can be said to cause an unconstitutional shift of the state's burden of proof,
because to prove self-defense is to negate the element of unlawfulness, a substantial ele-
ment of the state's burden. Cf. Martin, 480 U.S. 228 (Powell, J., dissenting); Patterson,
432 U.S. 197 (Powell, J., dissenting); Mullaney, 421 U.S. 684.
185. See Thomas v. Leeke, 725 F.2d at 248 (manslaughter can be defined as "unlaw-
ful or felonious killing"). Murder is defined as killing with malice aforethought. "Malice
is a word suggesting wickedness, hatred, and a determination to do what one knows to be
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renders homicide justifiable, the result in Bellamy is consistent
with the reasoning of Winship.
B. Rush Smith, III
IX. ISSUE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL NOT
WAIVED AT POSTCONvICTION STAGE IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
In Carter v. State8" the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that unless it is shown that an applicant for postconviction
relief is expressly informed of the dangers of being represented
by trial counsel at the postconviction stage and that the appli-
cant desires to proceed with the same representation, the issue
of ineffective assistance of counsel is not waived and may be
raised in a subsequent application.
During his 1982 murder trial, Eugene Carter, the defendant,
chose not to testify. He was convicted and sentenced to life im-
prisonment. He did not appeal. In 1984, assisted by the same
attorney he had retained at trial, Carter applied for postconvic-
tion relief. 1 7 At the postconviction hearing, Carter argued that
amnesia had prevented him from intelligently deciding whether
to testify at trial. The court denied postconviction relief.18 s
In 1986 Carter, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for
the first time, again applied for postconviction relief.8 " Carter
contended that his trial counsel had not informed him fully of
his right to directly appeal his conviction. The state countered
that the application should be barred as successive. 90
wrong without just cause or excuse or legal provocation." Id. at 248. Thus, malice afore-
thought is a concept that embodies evil and unlawfulness.
186. 293 S.C. 528, 362 S.E.2d 20 (1987).
187. Although it is uncommon for the same attorney to serve for both proceedings,
it is "not unique." Brief of Respondent at 3.
188. 293 S.C. 528, 529, 362 S.E.2d 20, 21.
189. Under S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976), a proper ground for post-
conviction relief is a claim that the conviction violated the United States Constitution.
The sixth amendment of the Constitution, applicable to the states via the fourteenth
amendment, requires that criminal defendants be provided the assistance of counsel.
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean the "effective" assistance
of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). The South Carolina
counterpart is State v. Cowart, 251 S.C. 360, 102 S.E.2d 535 (1968).
190. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-90 (Law. Co-op. 1976) provides:
All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this chapter must be
raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally
adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived
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In a conditional order,191 the postconviction court rejected
Carter's second application as successive. In his reply to the or-
der, Carter maintained that he could not have raised the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel in the first application since his
trial attorney also served as his counsel for the first postconvic-
tion relief application.192 Unpersuaded, the court issued a final
order of dismissal, from which Carter appealed to the South
Carolina Supreme Court.
The court first noted the well-settled policy against allowing
successive applications for postconviction relief. To overcome
this policy, "the applicant has the burden of showing that a new
ground of relief could not have been raised in a previous applica-
tion.19 3 Once this burden is met, the applicant is entitled to a
hearing "despite the successiveness of the application.
'194
in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other
proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for
subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted
which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the
original, supplemental or amended application.
Applications violative of this statute are "successive" and under Sup. CT. R. 3, "are
not to be entertained" unless the applicant can "establish that any new ground raised in
a subsequent application could not have been raised by him in the previous application."
The purpose of both the statute and the rule is to maintain the efficiency of postconvic-
tion procedure. Land v. State, 274 S.C. 243, 245, 262 S.E.2d 735, 737 (1980).
191. A conditional order is issued pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-70(b) (Law.
Co-op. 1976). This statutory scheme of court procedure for postconviction applications
provides that "[w]hen a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer...
and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose
would be served by any further proceedings, it may indicate to the parties its intention
to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing. The applicant shall be given an
opportunity to reply to the proposed dismissal. In light of the reply, or on default
thereof, the court may order the application dismissed. . .or direct that the proceedings
otherwise continue." Id.
192. Actually, this is neither theoretically nor practically impossible as Carter
claims.
193. 293 S.C. at 530, 362 S.E.2d at 21. While the cases cited by the court (Foxworth
v. State, 275 S.C. 615, 274 S.E.2d 415 (1981), and Land v. State, 274 S.C. 243, 262 S.E.2d
735 (1980)) support this proposition, the primary authority is SuP. CT. R. 3. See supra
note 190.
194. 293 S.C. at 530, 362 S.E.2d at 21. Again, the court's cited authority, Case v.
State, 277 S.C. 474, 289 S.E.2d 413 (1982), is peculiar. Case is not illustrative of an appli-
cant who proved that a new ground of relief could not have been previously raised. In-
deed, the applicant in Case raised (pro se) the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
in both his first and second applications, both of which the lower court denied. The
supreme court held that Case was entitled to a hearing based on "the unique combina-
tion of facts in this case," as well as Rogers v. State, 261 S.C. 288, 199 S.E.2d 761 (1973),
and Delaney v. State, 269 S.C. 555, 238 S.E.2d 679 (1977) (applicants alleging ineffective
36
South Carolina aw Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss1/6
CRIMINAL LAW
Despite its prefatory analysis, the court did not treat
Carter's contention of ineffective assistance of counsel as "a new
ground for relief [that] could not be raised in a previous applica-
tion."'9 5 Instead, the court isolated the issue to waiver, holding
that "[w]hen an applicant is represented on post-conviction re-
lief by his trial counsel, there is no waiver of the issue of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel."'1 6
The court further held that unless it is shown "that the ap-
plicant was specifically advised of the hazards of being repre-
sented by trial counsel at the post-conviction hearing and that
the applicant consented to such an arrangement, a successive
post-conviction application, alleging ineffective assistance of
trial counsel, should not be barred.' 97 Since the record did not
reflect that Carter was cognizant of these hazards, the court de-
creed that he qualified for a hearing on the ineffectiveness
issue." "'
The court promulgated a simple procedure designed to
identify and cure possible ineffective assistance problems at the
first postconviction hearing. When the applicant is represented
by his trial counsel at the postconviction hearing, "the court
shall advise the applicant that the dual representation will result
in the waiver of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The applicant shall then state on the record whether he wishes
to proceed, thereby waiving the issue. '
The result reached in Carter is desirable. A converse rule -
that ineffectiveness claims are waived even when the applicant's
postconviction counsel served as his trial counsel -would evis-
cerate ineffective assistance of counsel as a claim for such appli-
cants. Moreover, if failure to advance a claim of ineffectiveness
in the first application constituted a waiver when the applicant
assistance of counsel entitled to hearing unless allegations are conclusively refuted by
trial record).
195. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
196. 293 S.C. at 530, 362 S.E.2d at 21. The court relied on Commonwealth v. Via,
455 Pa. 373, 316 A.2d 895 (1974) (failure to raise claim of ineffectiveness of counsel does
not constitute waiver where petitioner represented at first postconviction proceeding by
trial counsel or one of his associates).
197. 293 S.C. at 530, 362 S.E.2d at 21.
198. Id. Presumably, if the applicant's first postconviction application is denied
without a hearing when he was represented by his trial counsel, the Carter rule does not
foreclose reapplication on the grounds of ineffectiveness of counsel.
199. Id., 362 S.E.2d at 22.
1988]
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was represented by his trial counsel, such a rule would require
the court to assume that counsel had apprised his client of his
own ineffectiveness.200 The Carter rule is a rational response to
these realities.
The court, however, ignored several tangential issues that
could have been dispensed with in dicta. Neglected, they may
fuel future litigation. First, the court did not provide a satisfac-
tory definition of waiver. Carter simply directs the postconvic-
tion court to question the applicant concerning waiver and then
to advise him that "the dual representation will result in the
waiver of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel."2 1 If,
after being advised, the applicant states on the record that he
desires to continue, he waives the issue.
This formula for waiver focuses on technical formalities of
advise and consent that could quickly deteriorate into an empty
convention. The test should center on what the applicant under-
stands, not on when he is routinely and qbjectively advised. 02
To that end, the court's questions should be "designed to elicit
from the defendant a narrative statement of his understanding
.. . [rather than] to elicit mere 'yes' or 'no' answers."2 Unfor-
tunately, the Carter rule seems to employ the latter type of in-
terrogation. Furthermore, the court should examine the defend-
ant only after he has had a reasonable time to appreciate and
contemplate the gravity of his situation. Implicit in the Carter
rule is an automatic, almost reflexive response by the defendant;
a reasonable time for the defendant to reflect would go far to
ensure that a valid waiver was secured.204 Finally, the court
should allow and encourage the defendant to discuss the issue
200. See Commonwealth v. Via, 455 Pa. 373, 316 A.2d 895 (1974).
201. 293 S.C. at 530, 362 S.E.2d at 22.
202. Maryland, a jurisdiction that has also adopted the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act, defined waiver in Wyche v. State, 53 Md. App. 403, 454 A.2d 378 (1983):
[T]he requirement of an "intelligent and knowing waiver" may be found
to be satisfied when . . . [the] defendant had a basic understanding of the
nature of the right which was relinquished or abandoned; and ... the relin-
quishment or abandonment of that right was made or agreed to by defendant.
Id. at 406, 454 A.2d at 379.
203. States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 889 (2nd Cir. 1982). Although discussing waiver
of right to conflict-free representation at trial, the principles of Curcio are sufficiently
analogous to augment a waiver on Carter-type facts.
204. See id.
[Vol. 40
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with independent counsel."'5
The second issue untouched by Carter is whether its rule
would apply when the applicant's counsel for postconviction re-
lief is not the same person as his trial attorney but is, for exam-
ple, from the same law firm or public defender's office.2 06 Since
such relative representation is probably common in the indigent-
intensive postconviction area, this question must be addressed.
By holding that, absent advice and consent, if an applicant
for postconviction relief is represented by the same counsel he
retained at trial and if the applicant fails to claim ineffective
assistance, he does not waive the issue, the court reached a
sound result on an issue of first impression. Still, the court's nar-
row and restrictive guidelines for waiver may not go far enough
to protect postconviction applicants.
David Garrison Hill
X. CODEFENDANT'S LIABILITY PREDICATED UPON DETERMINING
IDENTITY OF VEHICLE DRIVER
In State v. Leonard20 7 the South Carolina Supreme Court
addressed the issue of codefendant liability for reckless driving
that results in the death of another. The court granted Leo-
nard's request that it review the court of appeals'208 decision to
affirm the conviction of petitioner Leonard and his codefendant
Harris on charges of reckless homicide. The supreme court re-
versed and remanded the case. It held that when two persons
are charged with reckless homicide arising out of the same acci-
dent, and it is unclear which person was driving the car at the
time, the jury must be instructed to determine first which per-
son was actually driving before the other can be convicted for
aiding and abetting the driver.20 9
Harris and Leonard had been drinking in various nightspots
before they were involved in a head-on collision with another
205. Id. at 890.
206. Commonwealth v. Via, 455 Pa. 373, 316 A.2d 895 (1974), which Carter relied
on, held that the waiver rule applied when "during the first [postconviction] proceeding,
appellant was assigned counsel who was a member of the same office that represented
him at trial." Id. at 377, 316 A.2d at 898.
207. 292 S.C. 133, 355 S.E.2d 270 (1987).
208. State v. Leonard, 287 S.C. 462, 339 S.E.2d 159 (Ct. App. 1986).
209. 292 S.C. at 136, 355 S.E.2d at 272.
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automobile whose occupant was killed instantly. At trial there
was conflicting evidence concerning who was driving at the time.
Both defendants were indicted for reckless homicide. The trial
judge read to the jury the reckless homicide statute210 and in-
structed the jury that the word "person" should be read to in-
clude the plural. He also read the statute codifying the doctrine
of accomplice liability in vehicular crimes.21
The court of appeals affirmed both convictions,212 discount-
ing the defendants' argument that the jury should have been in-
structed first to determine which defendant was driving before
convicting the other. The defendants argued that the jury in-
structions as given could lead to convictions of both as princi-
pals without a finding that either was driving. The court of ap-
peals, however, found ample evidence that whoever was driving
was aware of the driver's intoxicated state and would be liable as
an aider and abettor in any event.2" The supreme court granted
certiorari on the question of whether the trial judge erred in in-
structing the jury that both defendants could be found guilty of
reckless homicide and reversed the conviction.214
The court first reasoned that a vehicular crime, by its very
nature, could have only one principal, as only one person could
actually be driving the car at any one time.215 Any other convic-
tions arising out of an incident would thus have to rest on ac-
complice liability and not liability as a coprincipal. Liability as
an aider and abettor requires a different element of proof from
that of a principal; it requires the principal's criminal conduct.
Therefore, the jury instructions should clearly delineate the dif-
ferent standards of proof involved for each defendant.21 The
court stated that the instructions, as read, could have led the
210. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2910 (Law. Co-op. 1976) ("When the death of any per-
son ensues within one year as a proximate result of injury received by the driving of any
vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others, the person so operating such vehicle
shall be guilty of reckless homicide . . ").
211. Id. § 56-5-6120 ("It is unlawful for the owner or any other person employing or
otherwise directing or the driver of any vehicle to require or knowingly to permit the
operation of such vehicle upon a highway in any manner contrary to law.").
212. 287 S.C. at 465, 339 S.E.2d at 160.
213. Id. at 468, 339 S.E.2d at 163.
214. Only defendant Leonard's conviction was reversed since defendant Harris did
not seek review in the supreme court. 292 S.C. at 135, 355 S.E.2d at 271.
215. Id. at 137, 355 S.E.2d at 272.
216. See State v. Collins, 266 S.C. 566, 225 S.E.2d 189 (1976).
[Vol. 40
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jury to believe they could convict both defendants in order to
assure the conviction of the driver, an interpretation the court
found unacceptable.211 The better solution involved instructing
the jury first to determine the identity of the driver and then to
decide if the passenger met the knowledge requirement neces-
sary for conviction as an aider or abettor. Since the instructions
actually given to the jury were confusing on this point, the court
determined prejudicial error had occurred and remanded the
case for a new trial. 18
The court's reasoning presents a new viewpoint on the
state's approach to accomplice liability. In South Carolina some-
one who aids and abets in the commission of a crime is usually
treated as a principal.21 This rule also has been applied in cases
involving vehicular crimes.22 ° The supreme court, however, has
now decided to carve out an exception to this principle for cases
involving the accomplice liability of passengers when the iden-
tity of a driver is contested. Although the court retains the rule
that a defendant may be convicted of aiding and abetting after
indictment for the principal crime, this opinion sets out a spe-
cific method a jury must use in reaching such a result.
Other jurisdictions presented with analogous situations have
approached the situation in various ways.221 Some have sur-
passed South Carolina's standards for conviction of a codefend-
ant by requiring not only an identification of the driver but his
conviction as well.222 Leonard referred to a North Carolina case,
State v. Dutch,23 which involved the contested identity of the
driver in a hit-and-run accident. Dutch held that aider and abet-
tor liability was predicated upon a finding that the other defend-
ant was the driver.
Since jury instructions in that case did not require this spe-
cific finding by the jury, the court held that until the State es-
tablished beyond a reasonable doubt that the other person was
217. 292 S.C. at 137, 355 S.E.2d at 272.
218. Id. at 138, 355 S.E.2d at 273.
219. See State v. Jiles, 230 S.C. 148, 94 S.E.2d 891 (1956).
220. See, e.g., State v. Cox, 258 S.C. 114, 187 S.E.2d 525 (1972).
221. See, Annotation, Criminal Responsibility of One Other Than the Driver at
Time of Accident, Under "Hit-and-Run" Statute, 62 A.LR2D 1130 (1958).
222. See, e.g., People v. Hoaglin, 262 Mich. 162, 247 N.W. 141 (1933); State v. Mc-
Farland, 158 Wash. 652, 291 P. 719 (1930).
223. 246 N.C. 438, 98 S.E.2d 475 (1957).
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the driver, there existed no basis to instruct the jury to find the
defendant liable as an aider or abettor.224 South Carolina appar-
ently views this reasoning as sound, suggesting a more thorough
analysis of the issues involved than previously had been given in
vehicular liability cases.
Although the court's reasoning is more detailed than in pre-
vious cases, Leonard's result seems problematic at first glance: it
might appear that codefendants could escape liability altogether
by each claiming that he was the passenger and the other was
the driver. If the jury could not specifically find one to be the
driver, and since such a finding must be made in order to impose
accomplice liability, both defendants could walk free. This view,
however, overlooks the realistic probability that a jury often will
have some competent evidence as to whom was driving the car.
Moreover, if a jury were aware that the principal and his accom-
plice both would be treated as a principal in terms of culpabil-
ity, the jury members might be more willing to go through the
formality of identifying the driver to ensure the conviction of
the guilty parties. Such cases often involve persons on joint ven-
tures acting in concert, and as long as enough evidence exists
that both parties were taking part in the outing, identity of the
actual driver may be immaterial.
Other situations, however, may produce no evidence as to
the involvement of the alleged passenger, who might, for exam-
ple, claim to have been asleep at the time of the accident. In this
case, the jury's determination of the driver's identity would be
crucial. The court's decision in Leonard is directed toward these
situations, for there would be a risk of convicting an innocent
passenger as a coprincipal in order to ensure conviction of the
driver. As a protection against abuse of due process, Leonard
will aid juries in protecting innocent guest passengers not in-
volved in the commission of an offense, without impairing a
224. Id. at 442, 98 S.E.2d at 478.
[Vol. 40
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jury's ability to convict obviously guilty codefendants.
Andrew E. Thomas
XI. DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE PROTECTS AGAINST SECOND
CONVICTION IF STATE RELIES ON PROOF OF SAME FACTS THAT
FORMED BASIS OF A PRIOR CONVICTION
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment provides
that "[n]o person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. '225 The principle on which
this provision of the Bill of Rights rests is that
the State with all its resources and power should not be al-
lowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for
an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possi-
bility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.22
Traditionally courts have held the constitutional prohibition of
double jeopardy to consist of three separate guarantees: "It pro-
tects against a second prosecution for the same offense after ac-
quittal. It protects against a second prosecution after conviction.
And it protects against multiple punishments for the same of-
fense. '227 In State v. Carter'2 8 the South Carolina Supreme
Court reaffirmed its recent adoption of a fourth guarantee: it
protects against a second conviction if the state relies on proof
of the same set of facts that formed the basis for an earlier
prosecution.
229
225. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Finding the double jeopardy prohibition to be "a funda-
mental ideal in our constitutional heritage," the Supreme Court has held the double
jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). The South Carolina Constitution also contains
double jeopardy protection. See S.C. CONST. art. I, § 12.
226. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
227. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)(footnotes omitted); see also
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977).
228. 291 S.C. 385, 353 S.E.2d 875 (1987).
229. This interpretation of the double jeopardy clause was first announced in State
v. Grampus, 288 S.C. 395, 397, 343 S.E.2d 26, 27 (1986)(conviction of improper use of
lanes barred a subsequent conviction of felony DUI because the state relied on and
proved the improper use of lanes as the "act forbidden by law," a necessary element of
felony DUI).
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On October 3, 1981, Carter was the driver of an automobile
involved in a fatal accident. Because of the circumstances sur-
rounding the crash, Carter was charged with driving under the
influence (DUI)230 and reckless homicide.2 31 First, the municipal
court tried and convicted him of DUI. Before his trial in circuit
court on the reckless homicide charge, Carter moved to dismiss
on the ground of double jeopardy. The circuit court denied the
motion and subsequently convicted him. Carter appealed the
second conviction.
To obtain a conviction for reckless homicide, the state must
prove two elements: (1) the defendant was operating a vehicle
with reckless disregard for the safety of others and (2) the de-
fendant's reckless driving proximately caused the death of an-
other.232 At Carter's reckless homicide trial, "the state relied on
and proved the same facts of the adjudicated DUI offense to es-
tablish the reckless act necessary to prove reckless homicide.
2
1
3 3
Thus, Carter contended that the second trial had put him twice
in jeopardy.
The supreme court agreed. The court's analysis began by
recognizing that the principal test for determining if two of-
fenses are the "same" for double jeopardy purposes, known as
the Blockburger test,2 34 is whether each offense requires proof of
a fact that the other does not.23 5 If the offenses are not the
"same" under the Blockburger test, then the second prosecution
is not barred.2 3 Applying the Blockburger test to Carter's case,
the court found it "undisputed" that DUI and reckless homicide
are not the "same" offense.237 Relying on the analysis it had
230. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2930 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
231. Id. § 56-5-2910.
232. Id. The resulting death must have occurred within one year of the accident.
233. 291 S.C. at 389, 353 S.E.2d at 876-77.
234. In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), the Court stated that
"[t]ho applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of
two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are
two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not." 284 U.S. at 304 (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S.
338, 342 (1911)). Thus, even though the Blockburger Court was not its formulator, this
"test" has come to be universally referred to as the Blockburger test. See, e.g., Illinois v.
Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 416 (1980); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977); Iannelli v.
United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975).
235. 291 S.C. at 387, 353 S.E.2d at 875-76; see also Vitale, 447 U.S. at 416.
236, See Vitale, 447 U.S. 410; State v. Norton, 286 S.C. 95, 332 S.E.2d 531 (1985).
237. 291 S.C. at 387, 353 S.E.2d at 876.
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adopted in State v. Grampus,23 the court nevertheless con-
cluded that in establishing the reckless act, a necessary element
of reckless homicide, the state had violated Carter's constitu-
tional right to be free from double jeopardy. The court focused
on the state's reliance and proof of the fact that Carter was driv-
ing under the influence, an act for which he had been previously
prosecuted. Accordingly, the court set aside the reckless homi-
cide conviction.
By its decisions in Grampus and Carter, the South Carolina
Supreme Court has embraced a suggestion found in dicta in Illi-
nois v. Vitale.239 In Vitale the United States Supreme Court
faced facts almost identical to those that confronted the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Grampus and Carter. Vitale was
before the Court on appeal from a denial of his motion to dis-
miss an involuntary manslaughter charge resulting from his in-
volvement in a fatal automobile accident. Vitale previously had
been convicted of failure to slow to avoid an accident. Applying
the Blockburger test, the Supreme Court rejected Vitale's
double jeopardy argument because involuntary manslaughter
and failure to slow to avoid an accident were not the "same.
240
Thus, prosecution of the manslaughter charge would not be
barred. The court, however, would bar a conviction if the state
found it necessary to rely on the facts surrounding the failure to
slow conviction to prove its manslaughter case.
The result reached in Grampus and Carter is correct. It re-
flects the Supreme Court's admonishment that "the State with
all its resources and power should not be allowed to make re-
peated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged of-
fense." 241 Furthermore, it provides a remedy in some cases in
which the Blockburger test fails to render full constitutional
protection. 42
238. 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26 (1986).
239. 447 U.S. at 421 ("[if in the pending manslaughter prosecution Illinois relies on
and proves a failure to slow to avoid an accident [for which Vitale has already been
convicted] as the reckless act necessary to prove manslaughter, Vitale would have a sub-
stantial claim of double jeopardy .... .
240. Id. at 419.
241. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
242. The doctrine of double jeopardy protects defendants (1) against multiple pun-
ishments for the same offense and (2) against multiple prosecutions for the same offense.
See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717
(1969). Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), involved the first of these two
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The remedy provided by the Grampus and Carter reason-
ing, however, is inadequate. The defendants were prosecuted
twice for the same offense. In each case, the conviction rendered
in the second trial was set aside; nevertheless, as a consequence
of a single accident, both defendants underwent the "embarrass-
ment, expense and ordeal" of standing trial twice.
In order to give the fifth amendment full effect, pretrial mo-
tions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy, like the ones
made by Vitale and Carter, should be granted unless the state
can make an adequate showing that it is relying on conduct
other than that for which the defendant was previously tried.
The Blockburger test should not be rigidly applied in all double
jeopardy cases. Courts should recognize the shortcomings of
such an approach by limiting its usage to multiple sentencing
cases.243 A transactional test is better suited to protect against
multiple prosecutions.2 4
Robert Wilson, III
XII. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
OVERTURNED ONLY IF COURT FINDS ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND
PREJUDICE
In State v. Spodnick24 5 the Supreme Court of South Caro-
protections. Accordingly, the Blockburger test functions to afford defendants adequate
relief from multiple punishments. On the other hand, because it was not designed to
protect against multiple prosecutions, the test fails to consistently provide adequate pro-
tection against such constitutional encroachments. See, e.g., State v. Norton, 286 S.C. 95,
332 S.E.2d 531 (1985) (Norton, charged with first degree criminal sexual conduct with a
minor, was acquitted at his first trial. After the acquittal, Norton was reindicted and
convicted for committing a lewd act on a minor. The second indictment was based on the
same facts as the first.). It does not necessarily follow that the test for determining
whether two offenses are the "same" for multiple punishment purposes should be used to
determine whether the offense for which the defendant was previously tried is the
"same" as the offense of which he is now accused. This distinction is perhaps best illus-
trated by examining the different meanings of the word "offense." An "offense" is de-
fined as "a breach of moral or social conduct; ... a crime." WEBSTER's NEw IN'L Dic-
TIONARY 1690 (2d ed. 1936). A convict should be punished only once for a single crime.
An accused should be tried only once for the same breach of social conduct. The Block-
burger test is designed to accomplish the former; a transactional test would better ensure
the latter.
243. See supra note 242.
244. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 170 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring).
245. 292 S.C. 68, 354 S.E.2d 904 (1987).
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lina affirmed a trial court's admission of a human bone fragment
as evidence in the murder trial of Anthony Spodnick. Spodnick
argued that the bone was unfairly prejudicial in light of his
counsel's stipulations. The court, however, rejected this argu-
ment and held that admission of the bone was not a prejudicial
error.
246
The controversy in the case arose when policemen were
searching a farm for a dead body. The police found a piece of
human bone before locating the rest of the victim's body. 7 Dur-
ing the trial, the State introduced the bone fragment in conjunc-
tion with the police officer's testimony of the search. The trial
judge admitted the evidence over the defendant's objections.
The jury convicted Spodnick of murdering the victim, Thomas
Boulware. Spodnick asserted that the admission was erroneous
because the bone was offered only to show the location of the
victim's body, an issue to which Spodnick's counsel stipulated 4
He argued that the bone lacked probative value and any
prejudice derived from its admission warranted exclusion. 49
The supreme court affirmed the admission. The only discus-
sion offered by the court, however, was its reliance on two well-
established principles: a trial judge's decision to admit evidence
in a criminal case will not be disturbed absent of discretion, and
a conviction will not be overturned absent a prejudicial error. 50
In dissent, Justice Finney implied that the majority's deci-
sion overrules Harper v. Bolton,251 a civil case. In Harper the
246. Id. at 69, 354 S.E.2d at 905.
247. Record at 41.
248. Spodnick's counsel stated:
Your Honor, if I might note for the record, I think the prejudicial aspect of
[the bone] bars what is any probative value. We stipulate that the bone found
was a human bone; we stipulate that there was some flesh on it. We stipulate
as to where it was. The only reason to introduce this item is to inflame the
passion of the jury. It has no evidentiary value. We would stipulate to basically
anything the Solicitor wants, rather than putting a piece of bone into the evi-
dence, Your Honor.
Record at 41-42.
249. Brief of Appellant at 21.
250. 292 S.C. at 69, 354 S.E.2d at 905. The court cited State v. Moultrie, 283 S.C.
352, 322 S.E.2d 663 (1984), in support of the proposition that the admission of evidence
is within the trial judge's discretion and State v. Knight, 258 S.C. 452, 189 S.E.2d 1
(1972), for the rule that a conviction will not be reversed for nonprejudicial error in the
admission of evidence.
251. 239 S.C. 541, 124 S.E.2d 54 (1962). South Carolina courts have not addressed
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supreme court held that the plaintiff's eye, which had been re-
moved after an automobile collision, should not have been ad-
mitted when the defense stipulated to the loss of the eye.252 Fin-
ney agreed with the defense that Harper controlled Spodnick's
case. He felt the bone was not offered to resolve a disputed issue
of material fact.215
Despite Finney's dissent, State v. Spodnick does not stand
for the proposition that evidence not offered to resolve a dis-
puted issue of material fact is always admissible. Instead, the
decision illustrates the discretion afforded a trial judge in weigh-
ing the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial im-
pact.254 The supreme court felt the judge's determination that
the probative value of the bone was not outweighed by its poten-
tial prejudice did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
The stipulations made by Spodnick's counsel undeniably re-
duced the probative value of the bone.255 Decisions from other
the admission of the victim's body parts in a criminal context. Other jurisdictions, par-
ticularly Georgia, however, have discussed the issue. For example, in Hance v. State, 254
Ga. 575, 332 S.E.2d 287 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1038 (1985), reh'g denied, 475 U.S.
1040 (1986), the admission of the victim's bones and teeth was upheld because they illus-
trated the force of the murder, an aggravating circumstance under the Georgia death
penalty statute. Further, in Moore v. State, 240 Ga. 807, 243 S.E.2d 1 (1978), pieces of
human flesh and bones were admitted to connect circumstantially the parts with the rest
of the victim's body. Finally, in Green v. State, 242 Ga. 261, 249 S.E.2d 1 (1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 442 U.S. 95 (1978), pieces of flesh, bone, and teeth were admitted as
relevant to show the causal relation between defendant's rifle, the bullets, and the vic-
tim's injuries. These decisions suggest body parts can be introduced only to resolve dis-
puted issues of material fact.
252. For a comparison of the stipulations made by Spodnick's attorney, see supra
note 248.
253. A dispute did exist as to whether the bone was, in fact, Boulware's. The State,
however, did not use a pathologist to make this connection. Instead, it chose to connect
circumstantially the bone, Boulware's body, and Spodnick. Brief of Appellant at 22.
254. The balancing test used by the judge is set forth in Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Rule 403 provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R Evm. 403.
The federal rules have not been adopted explicitly as a body in South Carolina. The test
of Rule 403, however, is a standard touchstone for determining the admissibility of evi-
dence in a criminal case. See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 24, 339 S.E.2d 692,
693 (1986).
255. See, e.g., Harper v. Bolton, 239 S.C. 541, 124 S.E.2d 54 (1962). See also State v.
Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986)(autopsy photographs of a rape and mur-
der victim were erroneously admitted because after defense's stipulations to any relevant
information contained in the pictures, the prejudice clearly outweighed any evidentiary
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jurisdictions, however, indicate evidence offered solely to corrob-
orate actual testimony has some probative value notwithstand-
ing stipulations.2 56 The trial judge seemed to have adopted this
approach in admitting the evidence. The state offered the bone
to corroborate the policemen's testimony of the search.257 That
testimony was designed to connect Spodnick circumstantially to
the murder.258 The trial judge, therefore, apparently determined
that the bone had probative value, albeit limited by the de-
fense's stipulations.
The admission of a piece of human bone was potentially
prejudicial. 5 9 The supreme court previously has held, however,
that evidence offered in corroboration of testimony that "por-
trayed a heinous crime" was no more than "harmless surplus-
age. 2 60 During Spodnick's trial, the nature and circumstances of
the murder were described in detail.261 The trial judge must
have felt that in the context of the entire trial the admission did
not trigger a great deal of additional emotional reaction,2 2 at
least not enough to outweigh its probative value. Further, the
supreme court apparently felt this decision did not amount to an
value). The introduction of photographs of a victim's body in a criminal case provides a
useful analogy to the use of body parts. South Carolina case law on this issue indicates
that photographs are generally admissible when geared toward disputed issues of mate-
rial facts. Further, they should not be excluded solely on the ground that they are in-
flammatory and corroborative. State v. Robinson, 201 S.C. 230, 22 S.E.2d 587 (1942).
256. In Georgia, photographs used to corroborate testimony were held to have pro-
bative value when the defendant stipulated everything the photographs would show. Per-
kins v. State, 152 Ga. App. 101, 262 S.E.2d 158 (1979)(corroboratory testimony that vic-
tim had a gun). In North Carolina, the victim's clothing, which indicated the entry point
of the bullets, was admitted despite defendant's stipulations as to the cause of death.
State v. Elkerson, 304 N.C. 658, 285 S.E.2d 784 (1982)(corroborative evidence enhanced
force of testimony).
257. Brief of Respondent at 11.
258. The state points out in its brief that connecting evidence can be circumstantial.
State v. Quillan, 263 S.C. 87, 207 S.E.2d 814 (1974); State v. Jordan, 258 S.C. 340, 188
S.E.2d 780 (1972); State v. Parker, 255 S.C. 359, 179 S.E.2d 31 (1971).
259. The prejudicial impact of the bone seems to be enhanced by the fact that the
trial judge remarked that this was "the closest case on circumstantial [evidence] in a
major case that I have had." Record at 106. The majority decision, however, does not
address this factor.
260. State v. Robinson, 201 S.C. 230, 234-35, 22 S.E.2d 587, 588-89 (1942)(evidence
was photographs of the victim's body after the murder).
261. Testimony indicated Boulware died from stab wounds and blows to his head
inflicted by a knife and a baseball bat. Moreover, the murderer severed Boulware's head
and hands from his dead body. Record at 41, 58, 69, 86-94.
262. Brief of Respondent at 12.
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abuse of discretion.
State v. Spodnick affirms the discretion afforded a trial
judge in balancing the probative value and the prejudicial im-
pact of admitting evidence.263 Practitioners should take note of
the supreme court's apparent willingness to review prejudicial
impact in the context of the entire trial.
A. Marvin Quattlebaum, Jr.
XIII. BALANCING TEST USED TO DETERMINE THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF PRIOR ACTS
In State v. Johnson s4 the Supreme Court of South Carolina
found that a balancing test approach was proper to determine
the admissibility of prior acts as evidence. In doing so, the court
reversed a criminal conviction, emphasizing the underlying im-
portance of preventing jury bias. The Johnson court also set
forth the substance of jury instructions that are to be given in
the sentencing phase of a capital case. The court held that any
deviance from those instructions could result in the reversal of a
criminal conviction.
In September 1985 the appellant, Richard Johnson, had
been hitchhiking and was picked up by Dan Swanson. Swanson,
who was traveling to Florida, picked up two additional
hitchhikers on the following day. It was on that day, while
Swanson was resting, that Johnson shot and killed him. Johnson
stuffed Swanson's body under a mattress and proceeded on his
southbound journey.
Hours later, Trooper Bruce K. Smalls was notified of John-
son's erratic vehicle operation, which was allegedly due to heavy
consumption of alcohol. After stopping the vehicle in order to
survey that situation, Smalls was killed. A Jasper County jury,
finding that Johnson had fatally fired upon Trooper Smalls six
times at close range, convicted him of murder. Johnson was sen-
tenced to death.
263. South Carolina's adherence to the rule granting the trial judge such discretion
is a majority view. Professor McCormick noted that virtually all jurisdictions follow this
approach. McCOnMICK ON EVIDENCE § 215 (E. Cleary 3d. ed. 1984). Further, it should
again be noted that Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence has not been adopted in
South Carolina. See supra note 254.
264. 293 S.C. 321, 360 S.E.2d 317 (1987).
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On appeal Johnson claimed several grounds of error, the
first of which concerned the solicitor's comments made during
the guilt phase of the trial. Johnson claimed that he was denied
due process of law when the solicitor argued to the jury that
Johnson had shown no remorse for his actions.26 5
Similar issues were presented in State v. Sloan266 and State
v. Brown.67 In both of these cases the Supreme Court of South
Carolina found that the solicitor's comments as to the defend-
ant's failure to show remorse for his conduct constituted gross or
flagrant error.
The court's opinion emphasized the underlying concept that
a criminal defendant possesses a fundamental right to plead not
guilty, putting the burden of proof upon the state. 68 Therefore,
any argument that favors punishment and is based upon an as-
sertion of that right is prohibited.26 9
Clearly, if Johnson had offered his apologies and remorse
for Trooper Small's death, he would have been defeating his
constitutional right to plead not guilty. Simply stated, "[i]t
would be highly inconsistent for [Johnson] to present a defense,
and, at the same time, say I'm sorry for something I did not
do. ' 270 The court relied upon this logic to support its ruling that
the solicitor's comments constituted reversible error.7 1
Johnson alleged as his second ground of error that improper
jury instructions amounted to a denial of his due process rights.
265. The solicitor made the following argument to the jury:
After [Johnson] heard his statement and after he told Ms. Burr that he had
blown Swanson's head off and he got on the stand, did he ever say he was
sorry? Did y'all hear him apologize? Did he tell Swanson, I'm sorry if I killed
your husband? I beg your pardon forgive me. I've asked my God to forgive me
Brief of Appellant at 5 (emphasis added) (citing Record at 1476). The solicitor made a
similar comment in reference to the murder of Trooper Smalls.
266. 278 S.C. 435, 298 S.E.2d 92 (1982).
267. 289 S.C. 581, 347 S.E.2d 882 (1986).
268. See id. at 590, 347 S.E.2d at 887; Sloan 278 S.C. at 440, 298 S.E.2d at 95. See
also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
269. See 289 S.C. at 590, 347 S.E.2d at 887 (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610
(1976)).
270. Brief of Appellant at 7.
271. Arguably the error in this case was even more harmful than in Brown or Sloan
because the solicitor not only referred to Johnson's lack of remorse as to Small's murder,
but he also stated that Johnson should have said that he was sorry for murdering Swan-
son, an incident for which Johnson was not on trial.
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Johnson contended on appeal that the trial judge did not strictly
adhere to the instructions regarding capital sentencing, as set
forth in State v. Norris27 '2 and State v. Plath.
27 3
In Plath the court noted that "[iln the sentencing phase of
a capital case, the jury shall understand the terms 'life imprison-
ment' and 'death sentence' in their ordinary and plain meaning
without elaboration. 27 4 The Norris court wholeheartedly sup-
ported the method of instruction set forth in Plath. Norris
broadened that notion by adding the requirement that the jury
should be informed that they are not to consider parole eligibil-
ity in reaching its decision. The result is a clear rule of jury in-
struction to be followed strictly in capital sentencing cases.
The significance of the instant case is that this decision in-
dicates that this "Norris-Plath" test is to be rigidly applied. 5
The Johnson court required both parts of the test to be met.
Therefore, in a capital sentencing proceeding, the trial judge is
to direct the jury (1) not to consider parole eligibility and (2) to
understand "life imprisonment" and "death sentence" in their
ordinary and plain meaning." 6 As indicated by the court's re-
sponse in Johnson, deviations from the instructions set forth by
this rule simply will not be permitted.
Finally, Johnson urged a reversal of his death sentence on
the ground that the introduction of detailed evidence27 7 of his
past crimes was highly prejudicial and irrelevant. In accordance
with the defendant's argument, the court immediately labeled
certain items of evidence as irrelevant, holding that they should
not have been admitted.2 7 8 The court, however, was not quick to
272. 285 S.C. 86, 328 S.E.2d 339 (1985).
273. 281 S.C. 1, 313 S.E.2d 619 (1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1265 (1984).
274. 281 S.C. at 14, 313 S.E.2d at 627.
275. This proposition is evidenced by the court's unwillingness to hold the instruc-
tions in the instant case to be sufficient, even though the judge did fully instruct the jury
not to consider parole eligibility in its deliberations.
276. 293 S.C. at 327, 360 S.E.2d at 321.
277. At trial, the State introduced evidence of grand larceny, armed robbery, and
Swanson's murder, all allegedly committed by Johnson. Id. at 325, 360 S.E.2d at 319-20.
278. The court immediately dispensed with any argument that evidence of prior
acts, such as (1) photographs of Swanson's body or (2) the testimony of a pathologist (as
to the etiology of Swanson's wounds) should be admitted. Id. at 325, 360 S.E.2d at 320.
The court held, "Evidence of other crimes is never admissible unless necessary to estab-
lish a material fact or element of the crime charged." 293 S.C. at 324, 360 S.E.2d at 319,
(emphasis added) (citing United States v. Johnson, 610 F.2d 194 (4th Cir. 1979); State v.
Byers, 277 S.C. 176, 284 S.E.2d 360 (1980); State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803
[Vol. 40
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find evidence of details surrounding the relevant prior-acts evi-
dence2 71 to be inadmissible. In its examination of such evidence,
the court adhered to the test set forth in State v. Wilson.8"
That is, when the admissibility of prior-acts evidence is at issue,
the court must "determine whether the prejudicial effect of the
evidence outweighed its probative value, which could result in a
jury reaching a 'legally spurious presumption of guilt.' ")281
The court found the volume of the testimony regarding
Johnson's past crimes to be overwhelming, thus resulting in jury
bias. Therefore, it ruled that the admission of "extensive evi-
dence in detail of appellant's prior criminal conduct"' 2 consti-
tuted reversible error. The court used a "totality of the circum-
stances"2 3 approach and looked to "the entire record" 28 4 in
reaching its decision, 8 5 providing some guidance to trial judges
with regard to prior-acts evidence. On the other hand, the "test"
used, due to its inherent balancing nature, fails to provide a
"bright line" boundary. Thus, much of the admissibility decision
is still left to the trial judge's discretion.
For example, the court noted that it did not wish to put
"impractical constraints" on the introduction of evidence in the
retrial of the case.286 It did not explicitly set forth which evi-
dence pertaining to the prior acts would be admissible and
which would not. Rather, the court intimated that such factors
as "probative value, potential prejudice, and the availability of
alternate forms of evidence"2817 should guide the trial judge in
his determination of admissibility. The value of Johnson as an
(1923)).
279. Such evidence included: Johnson's prior statement as to Swanson's murder,
Deanna Swanson's identification of items taken in the robbery, and Hess' and Harbert's
(the two traveling companions) testimony as to Swanson's murder, the robbery, and the
larceny. Johnson, 293 S.C. at 325-26, 360 S.E.2d at 320-21.
280. 274 S.C. 635, 266 S.E.2d 426 (1980).
281. 293 S.C. at 325-26, 360 S.E.2d at 320 (quoting State v. Wilson, 274 S.C. 635,
637, 266 S.E.2d 426, 428).
282. Id. at 326, 360 S.E.2d at 320.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. The court looked beyond the scope of the evidence itself. In reaching its deci-
sion as to the admissibility of the prior-acts evidence, the court also considered factors
such as "the solicitor's numerous references to appellant's prior crimes in closing argu-
ment." Id.
286. Id. at 326 n.2, 360 S.E.2d at 320 n.2.
287. Id. (citing G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 131 (1978)).
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indication of how trial judges are to deal with prior-acts evi-
dence appears minimal at best.
Overall, the prejudice created by these three grounds of er-
ror resulted in a denial of Johnson's due process rights and his
right to a fair trial. The case has been remanded to the trial
court, where some of the problems raised should be addressed.
Jeanne M. Nystrom
XIV. SCOPE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS NARROWED IN SOUTH
CAROLINA
In State v. Drayton288 the South Carolina Supreme Court
created new standards of criminal process. Affirming Drayton's
murder conviction and capital sentence,289 the court held: 1)
that the trial judge did not err in his opening remarks by cau-
tioning the jury venire not to be prejudiced by the defendant's
failure to testify; 2) that the trial judge properly admitted the
defendant's incriminating statements, although before the state-
ments were given, representatives from the Public Defender's
Office attempted to contact the defendant; and 3) that the trial
judge properly refused to charge the jury, as a mitigating cir-
cumstance of the crime, that the defendant drank alcohol on the
night of the murder.290
The defendant entered the victim's place of employment, a
convenience store, armed with a .347 magnum pistol. He ab-
ducted the victim and took her to a secluded area where he fa-
tally shot her in the head. The original trial jury convicted Dray-
ton and sentenced him to death.29 1 The supreme court found
reversible error and ordered a new trial, from which this case
resulted.
288. 293 S.C. 417, 361 S.E.2d 329 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1060 (1988).
289. On appeal the defendant raised eight exceptions. This article addresses three of
those exceptions. The court also held: 1) the trial judge properly excused two jurors for
cause because of their opposition to the death penalty; 2) the trial judge properly quali-
fied two jurors who had prior knowledge of the facts of the case; 3) the trial judge prop-
erly ruled that an in-court identification of the defendant was admissible; 4) the trial
judge properly refused to charge robbery as a lesser included offense of armed robbery;
and 5) the trial judge properly allowed the solicitor to refer the defendant's parole viola-
tions. 293 S.C. at 421-22, 361 S.E.2d at 332.
290. Id. at 422-30, 361 S.E.2d at 333-36.
291. State v. Drayton, 287 S.C. 226, 337 S.E.2d 216 (1985).
[Vol. 40
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The court held that the trial judge's opening remarks2"2 con-
stituted no reversible error.2 e3 The court distinguished two ear-
lier South Carolina cases 294 which held that similar remarks war-
ranted a new trial. The court reasoned that the statement in
Drayton was permissible because it "was not addressed to the
defendant as to the effect of his failure to testify nor was it a
charge as to defendant's accomplished failure to testify.
29 5
The United States Supreme Court held in Griffin v. Califor-
nia298 that certain remarks29 7 by a trial judge on the defendant's
failure to testify constitute reversible error.298 In Drayton the
South Carolina Supreme Court declined to extend to a criminal
defendant protection from any comment of a trial judge on the
defendant's failure to testify. Oddly, neither party cited Lake-
side v. Oregon.29 9 In Lakeside the trial judge charged the jury,
over the defendant's objection, not to consider the defendant's
failure to testify in determining his guilt or innocence. The
292. The trial judge cautioned the jury venire in the following manner:
[I]t's not up to you to seek out the reasons why a person doesn't testify.
You are to follow the constitutional mandate, and keep that in mind because it
is often difficult to control feelings that, "Well if it was me and I was accused,
you couldn't keep me off the witness stand. I'd be testifying." A lot of times
people say, "Well, where there's smoke there's fire." You hear these things
everyday.
Now while you are free to exercise those feelings as a citizen, when you
come as a juror and are seated in this jury box, you've got a higher duty and a
responsibility, and you've got to follow these principles of law that I give you.
293 S.C. at 423, 361 S.E.2d at 333.
293. The court, however, noted that "the remarks here were imprudent and we cau-
tion that such comments to jurors should be avoided in the future." Id. at 424, 361
S.E.2d at 333.
294. The court cited State v. Pierce, 289 S.C. 430, 346 S.E.2d 707 (1986) (death
penalty case in which trial judge warned defendant that the jury would hold his failure
to testify against him) and State v. Gunter, 286 S.C. 556, 558, 335 S.E.2d 542, 543
(1985) (voluntary manslaughter case in which trial judge told the defendant that "[i]f you
do not testify, you know that that jury is going to hold it against you").
295. 293 S.C. 424, 361 S.E.2d at 333 (emphasis in original).
296. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
297. The trial judge charged the jury that if the defendant "fails to deny or explain
... evidence, the jury may take that failure into consideration as tending to indicate the
truth of such evidence." Id. at 610.
298. Commentators have both praised and criticized Griffin. For a defense of Grif-
fin, see Saltzberg, Forward: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in
the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151, 204 (1980). But see Ayer, The Fifth
Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence: Griffin v. California After Fifteen
Years, 78 MiCH. L. REv. 841 (1980).
299. 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
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United States Supreme Court held that "it does not follow that
the cautionary instruction in these circumstances violates the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination."300
The Drayton court also held that the trial judge properly
admitted the defendant's confession, although the defendant
was not informed that representatives from the Public De-
fender's Office tried to contact him. On the morning Drayton
was arrested, an officer advised him of his Miranda rights, and
he invoked the right to remain silent. During the morning, the
representatives tried to reach Drayton to inquire if he needed
their services. After a bond hearing later that day, Drayton
signed a written waiver-of-rights form and gave a written state-
ment incriminating himself.301
To reach its conclusion, the court followed Moran v.
Burbine30 2 in which the Supreme Court held that "the refusal of
police to inform an accused that an attorney was attempting to
reach him did not present a federal constitutional claim." 303 The
defendant argued that Moran "merely permits such conduct"3 4
and urged the court to adopt the "New York rule' 305 as a matter
of state law. The court rejected this motion and declined to ex-
pand the rights of defendants in the attorney-client area.
This holding places South Carolina in the minority of juris-
dictions.30 6 Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Moran, nu-
merous state courts created a conclusive presumption that a
waiver was not valid if an attorney attempted to assist a suspect
and the police denied the suspect knowledge of this fact.307 One
300. Id. at 340.
301. 293 S.C. at 426, 361 S.E.2d at 334.
302. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
303. 293 S.C. at 426, 361 S.E.2d at 334.
304. Brief of Appellant at 18.
305. The rule provides:
[Q]uite apart from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
this State's constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to the privilege
against self incrimination and the right to counsel, not to mention our own
guarantee of due process, require the exclusion of a confession taken from a
defendant, during a period of detention, after his attorney had requested and
been denied access to him.
People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 151, 193 N.E.2d 628, 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 843
(1963) (citations omitted).
306. Note, Moran v. Burbine: Supreme Court Tolerates Police Interference with
the Attorney-Client Relationship, 18 Loy. U. CHL L.J. 251, 262 (1986).
307. See Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983); People v. Smith, 93 Ill.
[Vol. 40
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jurisdiction expressly rejected the Moran opinion.308 Moran is
also contrary to the American Bar Association's Standards for
Criminal Justices09 and has been sharply criticized.310 Thus, the
Drayton court significantly narrowed the scope of a defendant's
rights under South Carolina law.
The court further held that the trial judge properly refused
to charge the jury pursuant to section 16-3-20 of the South Car-
olina Code11 as a mitigating circumstance of the crime that the
defendant drank alcohol. According to Drayton's statement, he
consumed liquor and beer for approximately three and a half
hours prior to arriving at the convenience store. Drayton also
stated that while at the store he drank several sixteen-ounce
beers.3 12
Before reaching its conclusion, the court first acknowledged
State v. Pierce,313 a death penalty case in which the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that a trial judge's failure to charge
2d 179, 442 N.E.2d 1325 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983); State v. Heard, 408 So.
2d 1247 (La. 1982); Commonwealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass. 287, 450 N.E.2d 566 (1983);
Lewis v. State, 695 P.2d 528 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); State v. Haynes, 288 Or. 59, 602
P.2d 272 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980); State v. Jones, 19 Wash. App. 850, 578
P.2d 71 (1978).
308. In People v. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d 595, 724 P.2d 1166, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1986),
the California Supreme Court held: "We find ourselves unpersuaded by the majority
opinion in Burbine," and adopted the New York Rule. Id. at 610, 724 P.2d at 1174, 230
Cal. Rptr. at 149.
309. "At the earliest opportunity, a person in custody should be effectively placed in
communication with a lawyer." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, standard 5-7.1 (2d
ed. 1982). The ABA also filed a brief as amicus curiae in Moran urging that if police can
prevent communication between a lawyer and a suspect, "an important right to legal
representation will be lost." See Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 441 n.14 (1975) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
310. See, e.g., Note, supra note 306.
311. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). Section 16-3-20(C) requires
a trial judge to include in his instruction any mitigating circumstances which may be
supported by evidence. Subsections (C)(b)(2), (6), and (7) provide as mitigating
circumstances:
(2)The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influ-
ence of mental or emotional disturbance; ...
(6)The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his con-
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially
impaired;
(7) The age or mentality of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Id.
312. 293 S.C. at 430, 361 S.E.2d at 338.
313. 289 S.C. 430, 346 S.E.2d 707 (1986) (record showed that defendant consumed
alcohol and used marijuana and intravenous drugs).
57
Turnage et al.: Criminal Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw [Vol. 40
voluntary intoxication as a mitigating circumstance constituted
reversible error.3 14 The court distinguished this case by noting
that although evidence showed Drayton consumed alcohol, no
evidence showed that Drayton was intoxicated when the crime
was committed.3 15 The court declined to address the defendant's
argument that once evidence of a mitigating circumstance is
proffered, "the trial court is not concerned with the weight of
the evidence but rather only with the existence of evidence. ' 316
The Supreme Court in Lockett v. Ohio31 7 established the re-
quirements for state capital punishment statutes. The Court
concluded that the Constitution requires "that the sentencer
* . .not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor,
* . .any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." 8' In Eddings
v. Oklahoma319 the Supreme Court held: "The sentencer . ..
may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evi-
dence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such
evidence from their consideration.
3 20
At least three other state courts321 interpreted their capital
314. Id. at 435, 346 S.E.2d at 710-11.
315. 293 S.C. at 430, 361 S.E.2d at 336.
316. Brief of Appellant at 38. See also State v. Butler, 277 S.C. 452, 290 S.E.2d 1
(1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 932 (1982) (court held in death penalty case that trial court
is only concerned with the existence of evidence of an aggravating circumstance of rape
and not its weight).
317. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
318. Id. at 604 (emphasis in original).
319. 455 U.S. 104 (1982). In this case, the Supreme Court reversed the holding of
the Oklahoma court in Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. 1980). The Oklahoma
court held a trial judge properly refused to charge the defendant's troubled youth as a
mitigating circumstance because "all the evidence tends to show that he knew the differ-
ence between right and wrong." Id. at 1170.
320. 445 U.S. at 114-15.
321. The Georgia Supreme Court held that "[t]he trial court should exercise a broad
discretion in allowing any evidence reasonably tending toward mitigation." Brooks v.
State, 244 Ga. 574, 584, 261 S.E.2d 379, 387 (1979) (emphasis in original), vacated in
part, 446 U.S. 961 (1980). In Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428
U.S. 923 (1976), the Florida Supreme Court held that "[there should not be a narrow
application or interpretation of the rules of evidence in the [death] penalty hearing,
whether in regard to relevance or to any other matter." Id. at 539. Texas courts interpret
that state's death penalty statute "as allowing this trial judge broad discretion in admit-
ting evidence but requiring greater restraint in the exclusion of evidence." Note, State v.
Huffstetler: Denying Mitigating Instructions in Capital Cases on Grounds of Relevancy,
63 N.C.L. REV. 1122, 1133 (1985). For cases that have interpreted the Texas state
broadly, see Sanne v. State, 609 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), cert. denied, 452
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punishment statutes "as creating a permissive standard of ad-
missibility when considering mitigating evidence. 322 This per-
missive standard is based on the premise that the harm of ex-
cluding mitigating evidence outweighs the harm of the time
consumed in the presentation of evidence.3 23 The North Carolina
Supreme Court, however, recently has narrowed the interpreta-
tion of that state's capital punishment statute.324 That court's
approach has been criticized sharply because when a jury weighs
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, any evidence has the
potential to influence the jury "that the death penalty is not ap-
propriate for [a particular] defendant ... when all the evidence
is considered. 325 Thus, the Drayton court also significantly nar-
rowed a defendant's rights in the critical area of capital
punishment.
The Drayton court narrowed the scope of criminal process
in the areas of the right against self-incrimination, police inter-
ference in the attorney-client relationship, and the interpreta-
tion of South Carolina's capital punishment statute. Taken in
the confines of this case, the holding may not seem to have a
broad effect. Taken to its extremes, however, the holding may
significantly change defendants' rights in South Carolina
James F. Rogers
XV. EXPERT OPINION OF A CONVICTED CRIMINAL'S FUTURE
ADAPTABILITY TO PRISON LIFE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE IN
SENTENCING PHASE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT TRIAL
In two recent cases the South Carolina Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether expert opinion of a convicted crimi-
nal's future adaptability to prison life must be admitted into ev-
idence in the sentencing phase of a capital punishment trial. In
State v. Patterson328 and State v. Riddle27 the court held that
U.S. 931 (1981); McManus v. State, 591 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
322. Note, supra note 321, at 1131.
323. Id.
324. State v. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. 92, 322 S.E.2d 110 (1984) (court held that a trial
judge properly refused to charge the defendant's confession as a mitigating circum-
stance), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009 (1985).
325. Note, supra note 321, at 1131 (emphasis in original).
326. 290 S.C. 523, 351 S.E.2d 853 (1986), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 2490 (1987).
327. 291 S.C. 232, 353 S.E.2d 138 (1987).
1988]
59
Turnage et al.: Criminal Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REviEw [Vol. 40
this testimony must be admitted as mitigating evidence for the
jury's determination of whether to recommend life imprison-
ment or the death penalty. 2 In so doing, the court brought
South Carolina into line with the clear majority of states whose
courts have considered this issue. 2
In Patterson the jury convicted the defendant of murder,
armed robbery, and assault and battery of a high and aggravated
nature.330 Raymond Patterson then was sentenced to death for
the murder. During the sentencing phase of the trial, the defense
offered a clinical psychologist's testimony as to the defendant's
future adaptability to prison life. The supreme court held the
trial court's rejection3 3 1 to be a reversible error under the re-
cently decided Skipper v. South Carolina332 and overturned the
death sentence.
Until Patterson, South Carolina trial courts had discretion
to exclude evidence of future adaptability evidence as irrelevant.
In Skipper, however, the United States Supreme Court reversed
an earlier South Carolina death sentence on this identical issue.
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the exclusion vio-
lated the eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishments
clause.
328. The South Carolina Death Penalty Act, S.C. CoDn ANN. §§ 16-3-20 to -28 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1987), provides for a bifurcated trial in capital cases. The first phase deter-
mines innocence or guilt, and in the event of a conviction, the sentencing phase follows.
329. See infra note 353 and accompanying text.
330. Raymond Patterson approached Mrs. Matthew Brooks in a motel parking lot
near Irmo, S.C. and demanded her purse. In the ensuing struggle, Patterson threw her to
the ground. When her husband intervened, Patterson fatally shot him with a stolen pis-
tol. 290 S.C. at 524-25, 351 S.E.2d at 854.
331. The judge never specifically gave the basis for this exclusion. At the close of the
guilt phase, the defense attorney conceded that the supreme court had ruled previously
that future adaptability evidence was inadmissible. Record at 917. Despite this, the at-
torney gave the judge a copy of the psychologist's evaluation and requested its later
admittance "notwithstanding the. . . decision in State v. Koon." Id. at 920. When coun-
sel attempted to introduce this testimony during the penalty phase, Judge Kinon denied
the motion "on the grounds I previously stated." Record at 958. Although he never had
actually stated his grounds, it can be inferred from the defense attorney's remarks that
the basis for denial was State v. Koon, 278 S.C. 528, 298 S.E.2d 769 (1982), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1036 (1985) (court held that future adaptability was irrelevant and
inadmissible).
332. 476 U.S. 1 (1986). In Skipper the trial judge excluded defense testimony by two
jailers and a frequent visitor to show future adaptability to prison life. The prosecution's
evidence showing the defendant's probable future dangerousness, however, was
admitted.
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Skipper and Patterson placed significant weight on two
United States Supreme Court decisions, Lockett v. Ohio333 and
Eddings v. Oklahoma,3 3 4 in reaching this conclusion. Lockett
held that the eighth and fourteenth amendments require a sen-
tencing judge to consider, as mitigating factors, "any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death. 3 3 5 Eddings broadly construed Lockett to re-
quire submission to the sentencer of any relevant evidence the
defendant put forth in mitigation of the death sentence.3
Patterson relied on two additional cases which further
broadened Lockett on the issue of admitting psychiatric testi-
mony bearing on the defendant's future danger to society.
337
Following these recognized principles, Justice Chandler con-
cluded that future adaptability was potentially mitigating and,
thus, relevant and admissible. 38
In State v. Riddle the jury convicted Ernest M. Riddle of
murder, burglary, and armed robbery.3 9 The defense then of-
fered expert psychological testimony on his future adaptability
to prison life. During the sentencing phase, the defense argued
that if the prosecution could show the defendant's undesirable
past behavior in jail, the defendant's fourteenth amendment
right to equal protection should allow him to show probable fu-
ture behavior as well.- 0
The trial court, however, excluded this evidence based on
prior Supreme Court rulings,3 41 and the jury recommended the
death penalty. Relying on the factually similar Patterson, the
333. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
334. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
335. 438 U.S. at 604.
336. 455 U.S. at 114.
337. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (court held that the state could
introduce psychiatric evidence of a defendant's future violence); State v. Woomer, 278
S.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 317 (1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983) (over defense's objec-
tion, court allowed psychiatric testimony on future dangerousness).
338. 290 S.C. at 531, 351 S.E.2d at 858.
339. In the early morning hours, Riddle and his brother broke into the Gaffney, S.C.
home of Abbie Sue Mullinax. After stealing money, they inadvertently awoke Mrs. Mul-
linax and her daughter. Upon discovering the intruders, Mrs. Mullinax screamed, and
Riddle fatally cut her throat with a knife from her kitchen. 291 S.C. at 233, 353 S.E.2d at
139.
340. Record at 987.
341. Id. at 987-88.
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supreme court reversed and remanded for failure to admit the
psychologist's testimony.342
Riddle and Patterson correctly overruled earlier cases that
courts had decided in direct contradiction to well-settled rules of
mitigating evidence.343 These opinions cited Skipper as the basis
for reversal, without expressly articulating the constitutional
rights that had been violated by the lower courts' exclusion. The
trial courts disregarded these protections and excluded the char-
acter evidence on the grounds that it was irrelevant. This deter-
mination was constitutionally flawed in two respects.
First, the eighth amendment requires the sentencer to have
before him all relevant aspects of the defendant's character or
record. Nevertheless, in Riddle the trial court used this proposi-
tion only as justification for admitting the state's evidence of a
defendant's future dangerousness. Although the court offered no
explanation for this inconsistency, it disallowed as irrelevant the
future adaptability evidence. 44 The supreme court's reliance on
Lockett and Eddings shows that admitting this evidence was not
merely discretionary; rather, it was constitutionally mandated
by the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishments
clause.34 5
Due process also compels this new evidentiary rule. There
are two possible due process grounds upon which to base these
decision. First, as the Patterson court noted, future dangerous-
ness was properly admissible as a relevant indication that the
defendant would pose a danger to the community if not exe-
cuted.3 6 The court concluded that "[a] defendant has a recipro-
cal right to present evidence that his probable future conduct
342. Skipper was decided between the trial court decision and this appeal. There-
fore, the prosecution conceded that if the court found the excluded testimony to be evi-
dence regarding the defendant's future adaptability or dangerousness, then it could
properly remand the case to rehear the sentencing phase. Brief of Respondent at 17.
343. See, e.g., State v. Elmore, 286 S.C. 70, 332 S.E.2d 762 (1985), vacated, 476 U.S.
1101 (1986); State v. Skipper, 285 S.C. 42, 328 S.E.2d 58 (1985), rev'd, 476 U.S. 1 (1986);
State v. Stewart, 283 S.C. 104, 320 S.E.2d 447 (1984); State v. Koon, 278 S.C. 528, 298
S.E.2d 769 (1982), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1036 (1985). Cf. State v. Woomer, 278 S.C. 468,
299 S.E.2d 317 (1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983).
344. 291 S.C. at 235, 353 S.E.2d at 140.
345. Id. at 235-36, 353 S.E.2d at 141; 290 S.C. at 529-30, 351 S.E.2d at 856-57. See
also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
346. 290 S.C. at 530, 351 S.E.2d at 857.
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would not pose danger if he were given a life sentence. ' 347 To
hold differently would sanction an unequal footing at trial,
thereby unfairly denying the defendant due process of law. 48
Since the risk of mistake is so high in a capital case and the
penalty so severe, 4 9 it is fundamentally unfair to exclude any
evidence even marginally probative of a defendant's character.35
This is imperative although it may not be the most expedient
method of conducting the trial. Future adaptability evidence is
relative to the defendant's character, and, therefore, due process
prohibits its exclusion in the critical sentencing phase.3 51 As fur-
ther indication that prior South Carolina law was in error, no
other jurisdiction in the United States has specifically excluded
future adaptability as mitigating evidence. 52 The few state
courts considering this issue simply have assumed the relevance
and admissibility of a defendant's prison conduct. 53 Therefore,
347. Id. (emphasis added).
348. See infra note 351.
349. Chief Justice Burger stated in Lockett that there is a "qualitative difference
between death and other penalties [that] calls for a greater degree of reliability when the
death sentence is imposed." 438 U.S. at 604.
350. While at first blush this evidence of future adaptability may seem inconsequen-
tial, this maynot be true. In an interview with David I. Bruck, the defense attorney who
successfully argued Skipper before the United States Supreme Court, he noted that this
evidence may well tip the scales in favor of a defendant in certain situations. For exam-
ple, when a sentencing jury entertains serious doubt as to which sentence to impose, the
jurors naturally would look at what would likely happen if the defendant lives and re-
turns to society. Mr. Bruck feels this is a recurring concern among jurors who don't fully
understand the state probation system. Interview with David I. Bruck, in Columbia,
South Carolina (October 1987).
351. Justice White, in Skipper, noted that "it is ... the elemental due process re-
quirement that a defendant not be sentenced to death 'on the basis of information which
he had no opportunity to deny or explain."' 476 U.S. 1, 5 n.1 (1986) (quoting Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977)).
352. But see State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1056 (1982), reh'g. denied, 459 U.S. 1189 (1983). The North Carolina Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's exclusion of a defense psychiatrist's testimony concerning
whether the convicted murderer would be able to adjust to life imprisonment. The court
stated that, even assuming this testimony had "some slight relevancy" to the sentencing,
the evidence was properly excluded because of an insufficient foundation. Id. at 21-22
n.10, 292 S.E.2d at 220 n.10.
353. See, e.g., Delap v. State, 440 So. 2d 1242, 1254 (Fla. 1983) (court considered, as
mitigating evidence, defendant's conduct on death row); Irving v. State, 498 So. 2d 305
(Miss. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1986 (1987), reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 3200 (1987)
(evidence admitted of good conduct on death row prior to trial); State v. Teague, 680
S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tenn. 1984) (mitigation evidence of defendant's adjustment to prison
life and good conduct admitted); State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 553 (Tenn. 1984)
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Patterson and Riddle are important steps in bringing South
Carolina into line with the rest of the nation on this issue.
These cases will be applied retroactively. In Truesdale v.
Aiken,354 the court interpreted Skipper's retroactive effect as
limited to cases pending on direct appeal and did not apply to
collateral attack. The United States Supreme Court, however,
reversed this judgment.3 55 The result is that Skipper will apply
to cases that were final at the time it was decided. For these
reasons, it is likely that Patterson and Riddle will be retroactive
minimally to 1978, the time of the Lockett decision, and proba-
bly to 1977 when South Carolina reinstated the death penalty. 56
There are limits to this rule: although expert opinion of fu-
ture adaptability is admissible, lay opinion is not.3 57 On the
other hand, given the courts' broad interpretations of Lockett, it
is not improbable that lay testimony also will be allowed in the
future.358 Despite these limits, Patterson and Riddle clearly re-
present a step forward in defendants' rights in South Carolina.
Elizabeth Scott Moise
(mitigation evidence about defendant's conduct since incarceration was "clearly
admissible").
The Arizona Supreme Court actually reduced a death sentence to life imprisonment
based in part on the defendant's excellent prison record. See State v. Watson, 129 Ariz.
60, 628 P.2d 943 (1981).
354. 289 S.C. 488, 347 S.E.2d 101 (1986).
355. 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
356. The 1974 statute was declared unconstitutional in State v. Rumsey, 267 S.C.
236, 226 S.E.2d 894 (1976). The state legislature adopted a new method of imposing
capital punishment for murder which became effective on June 8, 1977. See Hubbard, A
"Meaningful" Basis for the Death Penalty: The Practice, Constitutionality, and Justice
of Capital Punishment in South Carolina, 34 S.C.L. REv. 391 (1982).
357. Patterson made the distinction between accepting expert testimony and lay
opinion testimony on the issue of future conduct and made it clear that the latter is
unacceptable. Justice Chandler, however, also stated, "We have no quarrel with the hold-
ing that testimony from lay witnesses is admissible on the issue of past conduct." 290
S.C. at 532, 351 S.E.2d at 858.
358. See also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), which asserted that "it is not
impossible for even a lay person [to] sensibly arrive at that conclusion [of future danger-
ousness]." Id. at 896.
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